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This chapter studies the microeconometric treatment-eﬀect and structural approaches to
dynamic policy evaluation. First, we discuss a reduced-form approach based on a sequential
randomization or dynamic matching assumption that is popular in biostatistics. We then discuss
two complementary approaches for treatments that are single stopping times and that allow for
non-trivial dynamic selection on unobservables. The ﬁrst builds on continuous-time duration and
event-history models. The second extends the discrete-time dynamic discrete-choice literature.
1 Introduction
The methods discussed in Parts 1 and 2 of this volume are useful for microeconometric policy
evaluation. That ﬁeld analyzes the eﬀects of policy interventions on individual outcomes. Panel
data facilitate the identiﬁcation and estimation of such eﬀects. Panel data are especially helpful in
analyzing the individual dynamic consequences of policies and outcomes, which are mostly neglected
in the vast cross-sectional literature on this topic. Not surprisingly, panel-data methods are becoming
more widely used in the microeconometric policy evaluation literature. In this chapter we critically
review recently developed methods and their applications.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents the policy evaluation problem and
discusses the treatment-eﬀect approach to policy evaluation. It establishes the notation used in the
rest of this chapter. Section 3 reviews an approach to the analysis of dynamic treatment eﬀects
based on a sequential randomization assumption that is popular in biostatistics (Gill and Robins,
2001; Lok, 2007; Robins, 1997) and has been applied in economics (see Fitzenberger, Osikominu,
and V¨ olter, 2006, and Lechner and Miquel, 2002). This is a dynamic version of matching. We
relate the assumptions justifying this approach to the assumptions underlying the econometric
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1dynamic discrete-choice literature based on Rust’s (1987) conditional-independence condition which,
as discussed in section 5.5 below, is frequently invoked in the structural econometrics literature. We
note the limitations of the dynamic matching treatment-eﬀect approach in accounting for dynamic
information accumulation. In sections 4 and 5, we discuss two econometric approaches for the
analysis of treatment times that allow for non-trivial dynamic selection on unobservables. Section 4
discusses the continuous-time event-history approach to policy evaluation (Abbring and Van den
Berg, 2003b, 2005) and Abbring (2008). Section 5 introduces an approach developed by Heckman
and Navarro (2007) that builds on and extends the discrete-time dynamic discrete-choice literature.
Like the analysis of Abbring and Van den Berg, it does not rely on the conditional-independence
assumptions used in dynamic matching. The two complementary approaches surveyed in this chapter
span the existing econometric literature on dynamic treatment eﬀects.
2 Policy Evaluation and Treatment Eﬀects
2.1 The Evaluation Problem
We introduce some key ideas and set up the notation for this chapter by reviewing the static policy
evaluation problem discussed in, e.g., Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a). Let Ω be the set of agent
types. It is the sample space of a probability space (Ω,I,P), and all choices and outcomes are
random variables deﬁned on this probability space. Each agent type ω ∈ Ω represents a single agent
in a particular state of nature. We could distinguish variation between agents from within-agent
randomness by taking Ω = J × ˜ Ω, with J the set of agents and ˜ Ω the set of possible states of nature.
However, we do not make this distinction explicit in this chapter, and often simply refer to agents
instead of agent types.1
Consider a policy that targets the allocation of each agent in Ω to a single treatment from a set S.
In the most basic binary version, S = {0,1}, where “1” represents “treatment”, such as a training
program, and “0” some baseline, “control” program. Alternatively, S could take a continuum of
values, e.g., R+ = [0,∞), representing, e.g., unemployment beneﬁt levels, or duration of time in a
program.
A policy p = (a,τ) ∈ A×T ≡ P consists of a planner’s rule a : Ω → B for allocating constraints
and incentives to agents, and a rule τ : Ω × A → S that generates agent treatment choices for a
given constraint allocation a. This framework allows agent ω’s treatment choice to depend both on
the constraint assignment mechanism a— in particular, the distribution of the constraints in the
population— and on the constraints a(ω) ∈ B assigned to agent ω.
The randomness in the planner’s constraint assignment a may reﬂect heterogeneity of agents as
observed by the planner, but it may also be due to explicit randomization. For example, consider
proﬁling on background characteristics of potential participants in the assignment a to treatment
eligibility. If the planner observes some background characteristics on individuals in the population
of interest, she could choose eligibility status to be a deterministic function of those characteristics
1For example, we could have Ω = [0,1] indexing the population of agents, with P being Lebesgue measure on [0,1].
Alternatively, we could take Ω = [0,1] × ˜ Ω and have [0,1] represent the population of agents and ˜ Ω states of nature.
2and, possibly, some other random variable under her control by randomization. This includes the
special case in which the planner randomizes persons into eligibility. We denote the information set
generated by the variables observed by the planner when she assigns constraints, including those
generated through deliberate randomization, by IP.2 The planner’s information set IP determines
how precisely she can target each agent’s ω when assigning constraints. The variables in the infor-
mation set fully determine the constraints assignment a.
Subsequent to the planner’s constraints assignment a, each agent ω chooses treatment τ(ω,a).
We assume that agents know the constraint assignment mechanism a in place. However, agents do
not directly observe their types ω, but only observe realizations IA(ω) of some random variables IA.
For given a ∈ A, agent ω’s treatment choice τ(ω,a) can only depend on ω through his observations
IA(ω). Typically, IA(ω) includes the variables used by the planner in determining a(ω), so that
agents know the constraints that they are facing. Other components of IA(ω) may be determinants
of preferences and outcomes. Variation in IA(ω) across ω may thus reﬂect preference heterogeneity,
heterogeneity in the assigned constraints, and heterogeneity in outcome predictors. We use IA to
denote the information set generated by IA.3 An agent’s information set IA determines how precisely
the agent can tailor his treatment choice to his type ω. For expositional convenience, we assume
that agents know more when choosing treatment than what the planner knows when assigning
constraints, so that IA ⊇ IP. One consequence is that agents observe the constraints a(ω) assigned
to them, as previously discussed. In turn, the econometrician may not have access to all of the
information that is used by the agents when they choose treatment.4 In this case, IA 6⊆ IE, where
IE denotes the econometrician’s information set.
We deﬁne sp(ω) as the treatment selected by agent ω under policy p. With p = (a,τ), we
have that sp(ω) = τ(ω,a). The random variable sp : Ω → S represents the allocation of agents to
treatments implied by policy p.5 Randomness in this allocation reﬂects both heterogeneity in the
planner’s assignment of constraints and the agents’ heterogenous responses to this assignment. One
extreme case arises if the planner assigns agents to treatment groups and agents perfectly comply,
so that B = S and sp(ω) = τ(ω,a) = a(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. In this case, all variation of sp is due to
heterogeneity in the constraints a(ω) across agents ω. At the other extreme, agents do not respond
at all to the incentives assigned by mechanisms in A, and τ(a,ω) = τ(a0,ω) for all a,a0 ∈ A and
ω ∈ Ω. In general, there are policies that have a nontrivial (that is, nondegenerate) constraint
2Formally, IP is a sub-σ-algebra of I and a is assumed to be IP-measurable.
3Formally, IA is a sub-σ-algebra of I— the σ-algebra generated by IA— and ω ∈ Ω 7→ τ(ω,a) ∈ S should be
IA-measurable for all a ∈ A. The possibility that diﬀerent agents have diﬀerent information sets is allowed for because
a distinction between agents and states of nature is implicit. As suggested in the introduction to this section, we can
make it explicit by distinguishing a set J of agents and a set ˜ Ω of states of nature and writing Ω = J × ˜ Ω. For
expositional convenience, let J be ﬁnite. We can model the case that agents observe their identity j by assuming that
the random variable JA on Ω that reveals their identity, that is JA(j, ˜ ω) = j, is in their information set IA. If agents,
in addition, observe some other random variable V on Ω, then the information set IA generated by (JA,V ) can be
interpreted as providing each agent j ∈ J with perfect information about his identity j and with the agent-j-speciﬁc
information about the state of nature ˜ ω encoded in the random variable ˜ ω 7→ V (j, ˜ ω) on ˜ Ω.
4See the discussion by Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b, sections 2 and 9).
5Formally, {sp}p∈A×T is a stochastic process indexed by p.
3assignment a, where at least some agents respond to the assigned constraints a in their treatment
choice, τ(a,ω) 6= τ(a0,ω) for some a,a0 ∈ A and ω ∈ Ω.
We seek to evaluate a policy p in terms of some outcome Yp, for example, earnings. For each
p ∈ P, Yp is a random variable deﬁned on the population Ω. The evaluation can focus on objective
outcomes Yp, on the subjective valuation R(Yp) of Yp by the planner or the agents, or on both types
of outcomes. The evaluation can be performed relative to a variety of information sets reﬂecting
diﬀerent actors (the agent, the planner and the econometrician) and the arrival of information in
diﬀerent time periods. Thus, the randomness of Yp may represent both (ex ante) heterogeneity
among agents known to the planner when constraints are assigned (that is, variables in IP) and/or
heterogeneity known to the agents when they choose treatment (that is, information in IA), as well
as (ex post) shocks that are not foreseen by the policy maker or by the agents. An information-
feasible (ex ante) policy evaluation by the planner would be based on some criterion using the
distribution of Yp conditional on IP. The econometrician can assist the planner in computing this
evaluation if the planner shares her ex ante information and IP ⊆ IE.
Suppose that we have data on outcomes Yp0 under policy p0 with corresponding treatment
assignment sp0. Consider an intervention that changes the policy from the actual p0 to some coun-
terfactual p0 with associated treatments sp0 and outcomes Yp0. This could involve a change in the
planner’s constraint assignment from a0 to a0 for given τ0 = τ0, a change in the agent choice rule
from τ0 to τ0 for given a0 = a0, or both.
The policy evaluation problem involves contrasting Yp0 and Yp0 or functions of these outcomes.
For example, if the outcome of interest is mean earnings, we might be interested in some weighted
average of E[Yp0 −Yp0 | IP], such as E[Yp0 −Yp0]. The special case where S = {0,1} and sp0 = a0 = 0
generates the eﬀect of abolishing the program. Implementing such a policy requires that the planner
be able to induce all agents into the control group by assigning constraints a0 = 0. In particular,
this assumes that there are no substitute programs available to agents that are outside the planner’s
control (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007b, section 10).
For notational convenience, write S = sp0 for treatment assignment under the actual policy p0
in place. Cross-sectional micro data typically provide a random sample from the joint distribution
of (Yp0,S).6 Clearly, without further assumptions, such data do not identify the eﬀects of the
policy shift from p0 to p0. This identiﬁcation problem becomes even more diﬃcult if we do not
seek to compare the counterfactual policy p0 with the actual policy p0, but rather with another
counterfactual policy p00 that also has never been observed. A leading example is the binary case in
which 0 < Pr(S = 1) < 1, but we seek to know the eﬀects of sp0 = 0 (universal nonparticipation)
and sp00 = 1 (universal treatment), where neither policy has ever been observed in place.
Panel data can help to evaluate the type of static policies discussed so far, if interpreted as
short-run or even one-shot policies. Suppose that we have data on outcomes in two periods in which
two diﬀerent policies were in place. In a world in which outcomes in any period are not aﬀected
by the policy or outcomes in the other period, such data are directly informative on the contrast
6Notice that a random sample of outcomes under a policy may entail nonrandom selection of treatments as
individual agents select individual treatments given τ and the constraints they face assigned by a.
4between outcomes under both policies.
The standard microeconometric approach to the policy evaluation problem assumes that the
(subjective and objective) outcomes for any individual agent are the same across all policy regimes
for any particular treatment assigned to the individual (see, e.g., Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith,
1999). Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a) present a detailed account of the policy-invariance assumptions
that justify this practice. They simplify the task of evaluating policy p to determining (i) the
assignment sp of treatments under policy p and (ii) treatment eﬀects for individual outcomes. Even
within this simpliﬁed framework, there are still two diﬃcult, and distinct, problems in identifying
treatment eﬀects on individual outcomes:
(A) The Evaluation Problem: that we observe an agent in one treatment state and seek to determine
that agent’s outcomes in another state; and
(B) The Selection Problem: that the distributions of outcomes for the agents we observe in a given
treatment state are not the marginal population distributions that would be observed if agents
were randomly assigned to the state.
The assignment mechanism sp of treatments under counterfactual policies p is straightforward in
the case where the planner assigns agents to treatment groups and agents fully comply, so that
sp = a. More generally, an explicit model of agent treatment choices is needed to derive sp for coun-
terfactual policies p. An explicit model of agent treatment choices can also be helpful in addressing
the selection problem, and in identifying agent subjective valuations of outcomes. We now formalize
the notation for the treatment-eﬀect approach that we will use in this section using the potential-
outcome framework of Neyman (1923), Roy (1951), Quandt (1958, 1972) and Rubin (1974).7
2.2 The Treatment-Eﬀect Approach
For each agent ω ∈ Ω, let y(s,X(ω),U(ω)) be the potential outcome when the agent is assigned
to treatment s ∈ S. Here, X and U are covariates that are not causally aﬀected by the treatment
or the outcomes.8,9 In the language of Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice (1980) and Leamer (1985), we say
that such covariates are “external” to the causal model. X is observed by the econometrician (that
is, in IE) and U is not.
Recall that sp is the assignment of agents to treatments under policy p. For all policies p
that we consider, the outcome Yp is linked to the potential outcomes by the consistency condition
7See Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a), and Thurstone (1930) for results in
econometrics and extensive reviews of the econometric literature.
8This “no feedback” condition requires that X and U are the same ﬁxing treatment to s for all s. See Haavelmo
(1943), Pearl (2000), or the discussion in Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a,b).
9Note that this framework is rich enough to capture the case in which potential outcomes depend on treatment-
speciﬁc unobservables as in section 5, because these can be simply stacked in U and subsequently selected by y. For
example, in the case where S = {0,1} we can write y(s,X,(U0,U1)) = sy1(X,U1)+(1−s)y0(X,U0) for some y0 and
y1. A speciﬁcation without treatment-dependent unobservables is more tractable in the case of continuous treatments
in section 3 and, in particular, continuous treatment times in section 4.
5Yp = y(sp,X,U). This condition follows from the policy-invariance assumptions. It embodies the
assumption that an agent’s outcome only depends on the treatment assigned to the agent and
not separately on the mechanism used to assign treatments. This excludes (strategic) interactions
between agents and equilibrium eﬀects of the policy.10 It ensures that we can specify individual
outcomes y from participating in programs in S independently of the policy p and treatment as-
signment sp. Economists say that y is autonomous, or structurally invariant with respect to the
policy environment (see Frisch, 1938; Hurwicz, 1962; and Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007a).11
We illustrate the treatment-eﬀect approach with a basic example. Consider the evaluation of
an intervention that changes the policy from p0 to p0 in terms of its mean eﬀect E[Yp0 − Yp0] on
outcomes. For expositional convenience, let treatment be binary: S = {0,1}. Suppose that we have a
cross-sectional sample from the joint distribution of (Yp0,S,X). Assume that treatment assignment
under both the actual policy p0 and the alternative policy p0 is randomized, that is, both S and
sp0 are independent of the determinants (X,U) of the potential outcomes. Then, because of the
policy-invariance conditions,
E[Yp0 − Yp0] = E[y(1,X,U) − y(0,X,U)]
£
Pr(sp0 = 1) − Pr(S = 1)
¤
.
The mean eﬀect of the intervention on outcomes equals the ‘average treatment eﬀect” E[y(1,X,U)−
y(0,X,U)] times the net increase in the assignment to treatment 1. The policy evaluation problem
boils down to identifying the average treatment eﬀect, the distribution of the actual treatment
assignment S, and the distribution of treatment assignment sp0 under the alternative policy p0.
Under the assumption of randomized assignment, and provided that 0 < Pr(S = 1) < 1, the
average treatment eﬀect is identiﬁed as E[Yp0|S = 1] − E[Yp0|S = 0]. The distribution of S is
identiﬁed directly from the data. The distribution of sp0 is often known, as in the case of universal
nonparticipation (sp0 = 0) or universal treatment (sp0 = 1). Otherwise, it needs to be identiﬁed
using a model of treatment choice.
Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a,b) review more general evaluation problems and econometric meth-
ods that do not rely on randomized assignment, such as the methods of matching and instrumental
variables. Clearly, panel data, combined with stationarity assumptions, can help in addressing the
selection problem in the evaluation of static policies. We will not dwell on this application of panel
data to the evaluation of static policies, but now turn to the dynamic policy evaluation problem.
2.3 Dynamic Policy Evaluation
Interventions often have consequences that span over many periods. Policy interventions at diﬀerent
points in time can be expected to aﬀect not only current outcomes, but also outcomes at other points
in time. The same policy implemented at diﬀerent time periods may have diﬀerent consequences.
Moreover, policy assignment rules often have non-trivial dynamics. The assignment of programs at
10See Pearl (2000), Heckman (2005), and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a).
11See also Aldrich (1989) and Hendry and Morgan (1995). Rubin’s (1986) stable-unit-treatment-value assumption
is a version of the classical invariance assumptions of econometrics (see Abbring, 2003, and Heckman and Vytlacil,
2007a, for discussion of this point).
6any point in time can be contingent on the available data on past program participation, interme-
diate outcomes and covariates.
The dynamic policy evaluation problem can be formalized in a fashion similar to the way we
formalized the static problem in subsection 2.1. In this subsection, we analyze a discrete-time ﬁnite-
horizon model. We consider continuous-time models in section 4. The possible treatment assignment
times are 1,..., ¯ T. We do not restrict the set S of treatments. We allow the same treatment to be
assigned on multiple occasions. In general, the set of available treatments at each time t may depend
on time t and on the history of treatments, outcomes, and covariates. For expositional convenience,
we will only make this explicit in sections 4 and 5, where we focus on the timing of a single treatment.
We deﬁne a dynamic policy p = (a,τ) ∈ A × T ≡ P as a dynamic constraint assignment
rule a = {at}
¯ T
t=1 with a dynamic treatment choice rule τ = {τt}
¯ T
t=1. At each time t, the planner
assigns constraints at(ω) to each agent ω ∈ Ω, using information in the time-t policy-p information
set IP(t,p) ⊆ I. The planner’s information set IP(t,p) could be based on covariates and random
variables under the planner’s control, as well as past choices and realized outcomes. We denote
the sequence of planner’s information sets by IP(p) = {IP(t,p)}
¯ T
t=1. We assume that the planner
does not forget any information she once had, so that her information improves over time and
IP(t,p) ⊆ IP(t + 1,p) for all t.12
Each agent ω chooses treatment τt(ω,a) given their information about ω at time t under policy
p and given the constraint assignment mechanism a ∈ A in place. We assume that agents know the
constraint assignment mechanism a in place. At time t, under policy p, agents infer their information
about their type ω from random variables IA(t,p) that may include preference components and de-
terminants of constraints and future outcomes. IA(t,p) denotes the time-t policy-p information set
generated by IA(t,p) and IA(p) = {IA(t,p)}
¯ T
t=1. We assume that agents are increasingly informed
as time goes by, so that IA(t,p) ⊆ IA(t+1,p).13 For expositional convenience, we also assume that
agents know more than the planner at each time t, so that IP(t,p) ⊆ IA(t,p).14 Because all determi-
nants of past and current constraints are in the planner’s information set IP(t,p), this implies that
agents observe (a1(ω),...,at(ω)) at time t. Usually, they do not observe all determinants of their
future constraints (at+1(ω),...,a ¯ T(ω)).15 Thus, the treatment choices of the agents may be contin-
gent on past and current constraints, their preferences, and on their predictions of future outcomes
and constraints given their information IA(t,p) and given the constraint assignment mechanism a
in place.
Extending the notation for the static case, we denote the assignment of agents to treatment τt at
time t implied by a policy p by the random variable sp(t) deﬁned so that sp(ω,t) = τt(ω,a). We use
the shorthand st
p for the vector (sp(1),...,sp(t)) of treatments assigned up to and including time t
12Formally, the information IP(p) that accumulates for the planner under policy p is a ﬁltration in I, and a is a
stochastic process that is adapted to IP(p).
13Formally, the information IA(p) that accumulates for the agents is a ﬁltration in I.
14If agents are strictly better informed, and IP(t,p) ⊂ IA(t,p), it is unlikely that the planner catches up and learns
the agent’s information with a delay (e.g., IA(t,p) ⊆ IP(t+1,p)) unless agent’s choices and outcomes reveal all their
private information.
15Formally, a1,...,at are IA(t,p)-measurable, but at+1,...,a ¯ T are not.
7under policy p, and write sp = s
¯ T
p . The assumptions made so far about the arrival of information
imply that treatment assignment sp(t) can only depend on the information IA(t,p) available to
agents at time t.16
Because past outcomes typically depend on the policy p, the planner’s information IP(p) and
the agents’ information IA(p) will generally depend on p as well. In the treatment-eﬀect framework
that we develop in the next section, at each time t diﬀerent policies may have selected diﬀerent
elements in the set of potential outcomes in the past. The diﬀerent elements reveal diﬀerent aspects
of the unobservables underlying past and future outcomes. We will make assumptions that limit the
dependence of information sets on policies in the context of the treatment-eﬀect approach developed
in the next section.
Objective outcomes associated with policies p are expressed as a vector of time-speciﬁc outcomes
Yp = (Yp(1),...,Yp(¯ T)). The components of this vector may also be vectors. We denote the outcomes
from time 1 to time t under policy p by Y t
p = (Yp(1),...,Yp(t)). We analyze both subjective and
objective evaluations of policies in section 5, where we consider more explicit economic models.
Analogous to our analysis of the static case, we cannot learn about the outcomes Yp0 that would arise
under a counterfactual policy p0 from data on outcomes Yp0 and treatments sp0 = S under a policy
p0 6= p0 without imposing further structure on the problem.17 We follow the approach exposited
for the static case and assume policy invariance of individual outcomes under a given treatment.
This reduces the evaluation of a dynamic policy p to identifying (i) the dynamic assignment sp
of treatments under policy p and (ii) the dynamic treatment eﬀects on individual outcomes. We
focus our discussion on the fundamental evaluation problem and the selection problem that haunt
inference about treatment eﬀects. In the remainder of the section, we review alternative approaches
to identifying dynamic treatment eﬀects, and some approaches to modeling dynamic treatment
choice. We ﬁrst analyze methods recently developed in statistics.
3 Dynamic Treatment Eﬀects and Sequential Randomization
In a series of papers, Robins extends the static Neyman-Roy-Rubin model based on selection on
observables to a dynamic setting (see, e.g., Robins, 1997, and the references therein). He does not
consider agent choice or subjective evaluations. Here, we review his extension, discuss its relationship
to dynamic choice models in econometrics, and assess its merits as a framework for economic policy
analysis. We follow the exposition of Gill and Robins (2001), but add some additional structure to




t=1 is a stochastic process that is adapted to IA(p).
17If outcomes under diﬀerent policy regimes are informative about the same technology and preferences, for example,
then the analyst and the agent could learn about the ingredients that produce counterfactual outcomes in all outcome
states.
83.1 Dynamic Treatment Eﬀects
3.1.1 Dynamic Treatment and Dynamic Outcomes
To simplify the exposition, suppose that S is a ﬁnite discrete set.18 Recall that, at each time t and
for given p, treatment assignment sp(t) is a random variable that only depends on the agent’s infor-
mation IA(t,p), which includes personal knowledge of preferences and determinants of constraints
and outcomes. To make this dependence explicit, suppose that external covariates Z, observed by
the econometrician (that is, variables in IE), and unobserved external covariates V1 that aﬀect
treatment assignment are revealed to the agents at time 1. Then, at the start of each period t ≥ 2,
past outcomes Yp(t−1) corresponding to the outcomes realized under treatment assignment sp and
external unobserved covariates Vt enter the agent’s information set.19 In this notation, IA(1,p) is
the information σ(Z,V1) conveyed to the agent by (Z,V1) and, for t ≥ 2, IA(t,p) = σ(Y t−1
p ,Z,V t),
with V t = (V1,...,Vt). In the notation of the previous subsection, IA(1,p) = (Z,V1) and, for t ≥ 2,
IA(t,p) = (Y t−1
p ,Z,V t). Among the elements of IA(t,p) are the determinants of the constraints
faced by the agent up to t, which may or may not be observed by the econometrician.
We attach ex post potential outcomes Y (t,s) = yt(s,X,Ut), t = 1,..., ¯ T, to each treatment
sequence s = (s(1),...,s(¯ T)). Here, X is a vector of observed (by the econometrician) external
covariates and Ut, t = 1,..., ¯ T, are vectors of unobserved external covariates. Some components of
X and Ut may be in agent information sets. We denote Y t(s) = (Y (1,s),...,Y (t,s)), Y (s) = Y
¯ T(s),
and U = (U1,...,U ¯ T). As in the static case, potential outcomes y are assumed to be invariant across
policies p, which ensures that Yp(t) = yt(sp,X,Ut). In the remainder of this section, we keep the
dependence of outcomes on observed covariates X implicit and suppress all conditioning on X.
We assume no causal dependence of outcomes on future treatment:20
(NA) For all t ≥ 1, Y (t,s) = Y (t,s0) for all s,s0 such that st = (s0)t,
where st = (s(1),...,s(t)) and (s0)t = (s0(1),...,s0(t)). Abbring and Van den Berg (2003b) and
Abbring (2003) deﬁne this as a “no-anticipation” condition. It requires that outcomes at time t (and
before) be the same across policies that allocate the same treatment up to and including t, even if
they allocate diﬀerent treatments after t. In the structural econometric models discussed in sections
3.2.2 and 5 below, this condition is trivially satisﬁed if all state variables relevant to outcomes at
time t are included as inputs in the outcome equations Y (t,s) = yt(s,Ut), t = 1,..., ¯ T.
Because Z and V1 are assumed to be externally determined, and therefore not aﬀected by the
policy p, the initial agent information set IA(1,p) = σ(Z,V1) does not depend on p. Agent ω
has the same initial data (Z(ω),V1(ω)) about his type ω under all policies p. Thus, IA(1,p) =
IA(1,p0) is a natural benchmark information set for an ex ante comparison of outcomes at time
1 among diﬀerent policies. For t ≥ 2, (NA) implies that actual outcomes up to time t − 1 are
18All of the results presented in this subsection extend to the case of continuous treatments. We will give references
to the appropriate literature in subsequent footnotes.
19Note that any observed covariates that are dynamically revealed to the agents can be subsumed in the outcomes.
20For statistical inference from data on the distribution of (Yp0,S,Z), these equalities only need to hold on events
{ω ∈ Ω : S
t(ω) = s
t}, t ≥ 1, respectively.
9equal between policies p and p0, Y t−1
p = Y t−1
p0 , if the treatment histories coincide up to time t − 1
so that st−1
p = st−1
p0 . Together with the assumption that Z and V t are externally determined, it
follows that agents have the same time-t information set structure about ω under policies p and
p0, IA(t,p) = σ(Y t−1
p ,Z,V t) = σ(Y t−1
p0 ,Z,V t) = IA(t,p0), if st−1
p = st−1
p0 .21,22 In this context,
IA(t,p) = IA(t,p0) is a natural information set for an ex ante comparison of outcomes from time t
onwards between any two policies p and p0 such that st−1
p = st−1
p0 .
With this structure on the agent information sets in hand, it is instructive to review the separate
roles in determining treatment choice of information about ω and knowledge about the constraint
assignment rule a. First, agent ω’s time-t treatment choice sp(ω,t) = τt(ω,a) may depend on distri-
butional properties of a, for example the share of agents assigned to particular treatment sequences,
and on the past and current constraints (a1(ω),...,at(ω)) that were actually assigned to him. We
have assumed both to be known to the agent. Both may diﬀer between policies, even if the agent
information about ω is ﬁxed across the policies. Second, agent ω’s time-t treatment choice may
depend on agent ω’s predictions of future constraints and outcomes. A forward-looking agent ω
will use observations of his covariates Z(ω) and V t(ω) and past outcomes Y t−1
p (ω) to infer his type
ω and subsequently predict future external determinants (Ut(ω),...,U ¯ T(ω)) of his outcomes and
(Vt+1(ω),...,V ¯ T(ω)) of his constraints and treatments. In turn, this information updating allows
agent ω to predict his future potential outcomes (Y (t,s,ω),...,Y (¯ T,s,ω)) and, for a given policy
regime p, his future constraints (at+1(ω),...,a ¯ T(ω)), treatments (sp(t + 1,ω),...,sp(¯ T,ω)), and
realized outcomes (Yp(t,ω),...,Yp(¯ T,ω)). Under diﬀerent policies, the agent may gather diﬀerent
information on his type ω and therefore come up with diﬀerent predictions of the external deter-
minants of his future potential outcomes and constraints. In addition, even if the agent has the
same time-t predictions of the external determinants of future constraints and potential outcomes,
he may translate these into diﬀerent predictions of future constraints and outcomes under diﬀerent
policies.
Assumption (NA) requires that current potential outcomes are not aﬀected by future treatment.
Justifying this assumption requires speciﬁcation of agent information about future treatment and
agent behavior in response to that information. Such an interpretation requires that we formalize
how information accumulates for agents across treatment sequences s and s0 such that st = (s0)t
and (st+1,...,s ¯ T) 6= (s0
t+1,...,s0
¯ T). To this end, consider policies p and p0 such that sp = s and
sp0 = s0. These policies produce the same treatment assignment up to time t, but are diﬀerent in
the future. We have previously shown that, even though the time-t agent information about ω is
the same under both policies, IA(t,p) = IA(t,p0), agents may have diﬀerent predictions of future
constraints, treatments and outcomes because the policies may diﬀer in the future and agents know
21If s
t−1
p (ω) = s
t−1
p0 (ω) only holds for ω in some subset Ωt−1 ⊂ Ω of agents, then Y
t−1
p (ω) = Y
t−1
p0 (ω) only
for ω ∈ Ωt−1, and information coincides between p and p
0 only for agents in Ωt−1. Formally, let Ωt−1 be the set
{ω ∈ Ω : s
t−1
p (ω) = s
t−1
p0 (ω)} of agents that share the same treatment up to and including time t − 1. Then, Ωt−1
is in the agent’s information set under both policies, Ωt−1 ∈ IA(t,p) ∩ IA(t,p
0). Moreover, the partitioning of Ωt−1
implied by IA(t,p) and IA(t,p
0) is the same. To see this, note that the collections of all sets in, respectively, IA(t,p)
and IA(t,p
0) that are weakly included in Ωt−1 are identical σ-algebras on Ωt−1.
22Notice that the realizations of the random variables Y
t−1
p0 , Z, V
t may diﬀer among agents.
10this. The policy-invariance conditions ensure that time-t potential outcomes are nevertheless the
same under each policy. This requires that potential outcomes be determined externally, and are
not aﬀected by agent actions in response to diﬀerent predictions of future constraints, treatments
and outcomes. This assumption rules out investment responses to alternative policies that aﬀect
potential outcomes.
In general, diﬀerent policies in P will produce diﬀerent predictions of future constraints, treat-
ment and outcomes. In the dynamic treatment-eﬀect framework, this may aﬀect outcomes indirectly
through agent treatment choices. If potential outcomes are directly aﬀected by agent’s forward-
looking decisions, then the invariance conditions underlying the treatment-eﬀect framework will be
violated. Section 3.3 illustrates this issue, and the no-anticipation condition, with some examples.
3.1.2 Identiﬁcation of Treatment Eﬀects
Suppose that the econometrician has data that allows her to estimate the joint distribution of
(Yp0,S,Z) of outcomes, treatments and covariates under some policy p0, where S = sp0. These data
are not enough to identify dynamic treatment eﬀects.
To secure identiﬁcation, Gill and Robins (2001) invoke a dynamic version of the matching as-
sumption (conditional independence) which relies on sequential randomization:23
(M-1) For all treatment sequences s and all t,
S(t)⊥ ⊥(Y (t,s),...,Y (¯ T,s)) | (Y t−1
p0 ,St−1 = st−1,Z),
where the conditioning set (Y 0
p0,S0 = s0,Z) for t = 1 is Z.
Equivalently, S(t)⊥ ⊥(Ut,...,U ¯ T) | (Y t−1
p0 ,St−1,Z) for all t without further restricting the data. Se-
quential randomization allows the Yp0(t) to be “dynamic confounders”— variables that are aﬀected
by past treatment and that aﬀect future treatment assignment.
The sequence of conditioning information sets appearing in the sequential randomization as-
sumption, IE(1) = σ(Z) and, for t ≥ 2, IE(t) = σ(Y t−1
p0 ,St−1,Z), is a ﬁltration IE of the econome-
trician’s information set σ(Yp0,S,Z). Note that IE(t) ⊆ IA(t,p0) for each t. If treatment assignment
is based on strictly more information than IE, so that agents know strictly more than the econo-
metrician and act on their superior information, (M-1) is likely to fail if that extra information also
aﬀects outcomes. Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b) make this point in a static setting.
Together with the no-anticipation condition (NA), which is a condition on outcomes and distinct
from (M-1), the dynamic potential-outcome model set up so far is a natural dynamic extension of
the Neyman-Roy-Rubin model for a static (stratiﬁed) randomized experiment.
Under assumption (M-1) that the actual treatment assignment S is sequentially randomized, we
can sequentially identify the causal eﬀects of treatment from the distribution of the data (Yp0,S,Z)
and construct the distribution of the potential outcomes Y (s) for any treatment sequence s in the
support of S.
23Formally, we need to restrict attention to sequences s in the support of S. Throughout this section, we will assume
this and related support conditions hold.
11Consider the case in which all variables are discrete. No-anticipation condition (NA) ensures
that potential outcomes for a treatment sequence s equal actual (under policy p0) outcomes up to
time t − 1 for agents with treatment history st−1 up to time t − 1. Formally, Y t−1(s) = Y t−1
p0 on
the set {St−1 = st−1}. Using this, sequential randomization assumption (M-1) can be rephrased in
terms of potential outcomes: for all s and t,
S(t)⊥ ⊥(Y (t,s),...,Y (¯ T,s)) | (Y t−1(s),St−1 = st−1,Z).
In turn, this implies that, for all s and t,
Pr
¡




Y (t,s) = y(t) | Y t−1(s) = yt−1,Z
¢
, (1)
where yt−1 = (y(1),...,y(t − 1)) and y = y
¯ T. From Bayes’ rule and (1), it follows that
Pr(Y (s) = y|Z)





Y (t,s) = y(t) | Y t−1(s) = yt−1,Z
¢





Y (t,s) = y(t) | Y t−1(s) = yt−1,St = st,Z
¢
.
Invoking (NA), in particular Y (t,s) = Yp0(t) and Y t−1(s) = Y t−1
p0 on {St = st}, produces






Yp0(t) = y(t) | Y t−1
p0 = yt−1,St = st,Z
¢
. (2)
This is a version of Robins’ (1997) “g-computation formula”.24,25 We can sequentially identify
each component on the left hand side of the ﬁrst expression, and hence identify the counterfactual
24Gill and Robins (2001) present versions of (NA) and (M-1) for the case with more general distributions of
treatments, and prove a version of the g-computation formula for the general case. For a random vector X and a
function f that is integrable with respect to the distribution of X, let
R
x∈A f(x)Pr(X ∈ dx) = E[f(X)1(X ∈ A)].
Then,



















× Pr(Yp0(1) ∈ dy(1) | S(1) = s(1),Z),
where A is a set of Y (s). The right-hand side of this expression is almost surely unique under regularity conditions
presented by Gill and Robins (2001).
25An interesting special case arises if the outcomes are survival indicators, that is if Yp0(t) = 1 if the agent survives
up to and including time t and Yp0(t) = 0 otherwise, t ≥ 1. Then, no anticipation (NA) requires that treatment after
death does not aﬀect survival, and the g-computation formula simpliﬁes considerably (Abbring, 2003).
12distributions. This establishes identiﬁcation of the distribution of Y (s) by expressing it in terms of
objects that can be identiﬁed from data. Identiﬁcation is exact (or “tight”) in the sense that the
identifying assumptions, no anticipation and sequential randomization, do not restrict the factual
data and are therefore not testable (Gill and Robins, 2001).26
Example 1. Consider a two-period ( ¯ T = 2) version of the model in which agents take either
“treatment” (1) or “control” (0) in each period. Then, S(1) and S(2) have values in S = {0,1}. The
potential outcomes in period t are Y (t,(0,0)), Y (t,(0,1)), Y (t,(1,0)) and Y (t,(1,1)). For example,
Y (2,(0,0)) is the outcome in period 2 in the case that the agent is assigned to the control group in
each of the two periods. Using Bayes’ rule, it follows that
Pr(Y (s) = y|Z) = Pr(Y (1,s) = y(1) | Z)Pr(Y (2,s) = y(2) | Y (1,s) = y(1),Z). (3)
The g-computation approach to constructing Pr(Y (s) = y|Z) from data replaces the two proba-
bilities in the right-hand side with probabilities of the observed (by the econometrician) variables
(Yp0,S,Z). First, note that Pr(Y (1,s) = y(1) | Z) = Pr(Y (1,s) = y(1) | S(1) = s(1),Z) by (M-1).
Moreover, (NA) ensures that potential outcomes in period 1 do not depend on the treatment status
in period 2, so that
Pr(Y (1,s) = y(1) | Z) = Pr(Yp0(1) = y(1) | S(1) = s(1),Z).
Similarly, subsequently invoking (NA) and (M-1), then (M-1), and then (NA), gives
Pr(Y (2,s) = y(2) | Y (1,s) = y(1),Z)
= Pr(Y (2,s) = y(2) | Yp0(1),S(1) = s(1),Z) (by (NA) and (M-1))
= Pr(Y (2,s) = y(2) | Yp0(1),S = s,Z) (by (M-1))
= Pr(Yp0(2) = y(2) | Yp0(1),S = s,Z). (by (NA))
Substituting these equations into the right-hand side of (3) gives the g-computation formula,
Pr(Y (s) = y|Z) = Pr(Yp0(1) = y(1) | S(1) = s(1),Z)Pr(Yp0(2) = y(2) | Yp0(1) = y(1),S = s,Z).
Note that the right-hand side expression does not generally reduce to Pr(Yp0 = y|S = s,Z). This
would require the stronger, static matching condition S⊥ ⊥Y (s) | Z, which we have not assumed
here.
Matching on pretreatment covariates is a special case of the g-computation approach. Suppose
that the entire treatment path is assigned independently of potential outcomes given pretreatment
covariates Z or, more precisely, S⊥ ⊥Y (s) | Z for all s. This implies sequential randomization (M-1),
and directly gives identiﬁcation of the distributions of Y (s)|Z and Y (s). The matching assumption
imposes no restriction on the data since Y (s) is only observed if S = s. The no-anticipation condition
26Gill and Robins’ (2001) analysis only involves causal inference on a ﬁnal outcome (i.e., our Y (s, ¯ T)) and does not
invoke the no-anticipation condition. However, their proof directly applies to the case studied in this chapter.
13(NA) is not required for identiﬁcation in this special case because no conditioning on St is required.
Matching on pretreatment covariates is equivalent to matching in a static model. The distribution
of Y (s)|Z is identiﬁed without (NA), and assuming it to be true would impose testable restrictions
on the data. In particular, it would imply that treatment assignment cannot be dependent on
past outcomes given Z. The static matching assumption is not likely to hold in applications where
treatment is dynamically assigned based on information on intermediate outcomes. This motivates
an analysis based on the more subtle sequential randomization assumption. An alternative approach,
developed in section 5, is to explicitly model and identify the evolution of the unobservables.
Gill and Robins claim that their sequential randomization and no-anticipation assumptions are
“neutral”, “for free”, or “harmless”. As we will argue later, from an economic perspective, some
of the model assumptions, notably the no-anticipation assumption, can be interpreted as substan-
tial behavioral/informational assumptions. For example, Heckman and Vytlacil (2005, 2007b) and
Heckman and Navarro (2004) show how matching imposes the condition that marginal and av-
erage returns are equal. Because of these strong assumptions, econometricians sometimes phrase
their “neutrality” result more negatively as a non-identiﬁcation result (Abbring and Van den Berg,
2003b), since it is possible that (M-1) and/or (NA) may not hold.
3.2 Policy Evaluation and Dynamic Discrete-Choice Analysis
3.2.1 The Eﬀects of Policies
Consider a counterfactual policy p0 such that the corresponding allocation of treatments sp0 satisﬁes
sequential randomization, as in (M-1):
(M-2) For all treatment sequences s and all t,
sp0(t)⊥ ⊥(Y (t,s),...,Y (¯ T,s)) | (Y t−1
p0 ,st−1
p0 = st−1,Z).
The treatment assignment rule sp0 is equivalent to what Gill and Robins (2001) call a “random-
ized plan”. The outcome distribution under such a rule cannot be constructed by integrating the
distributions of {Y (s)} with respect to the distribution of sp0, because there may be feedback from
intermediate outcomes into treatment assignment. Instead, under the assumptions of the previous
subsection and a support condition, we can use a version of the g-computation formula for ran-









Pr(Yp0(1) = y(1) | S(1) = s(1),Z)Pr
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Yp0(t) = y(t) | Y t−1









In the special case of static matching on Z, so that sp0⊥ ⊥U | Z, this simpliﬁes to integrating the








Pr(Yp0 = y | S = s,Z)Pr
¡
sp0 = s | Z
¢
.
3.2.2 Policy Choice and Optimal Policies
We now consider the problem of choosing a policy p that is optimal according to some criterion.
This problem is both of normative interest and of descriptive interest if actual policies are chosen
to be optimal. We could, for example, study the optimal assignment a0 of constraints and incentives
to agents. Alternatively, we could assume that agents pick τ to maximize their utilities, and use the
methods discussed in this section to model τ.
Under the policy invariance assumptions that underlie the treatment-eﬀect approach, p only
aﬀects outcomes through its implied treatment allocation sp. Thus, the problem of choosing an
optimal policy boils down to choosing an optimal treatment allocation sp under informational and
other constraints speciﬁc to the problem at hand. For example, suppose that the planner and the



























×Pr(Yp0(2) ∈ dy(2) | Yp0(1) = y(1),S(1) = s(1),Z)
×Pr(sp0(2) ∈ ds(2) | Yp0(1) = y(1),sp0(1) = s(1),Z)
×Pr(Yp0(1) ∈ dy(1) | S(1) = s(1),Z)Pr(sp0(1) ∈ ds(1) | Z).












t−1,Z = z) for almost all
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t−1,s




28In the general case, this condition becomes
Pr(Yp0 ∈ A|Z) =
Z
s∈S
Pr(Yp0 ∈ A | S = s,Z)Pr(sp0 ∈ ds | Z).
15agents have the same information, IP(p) = IA(p), the planner assigns eligibility to a program by a,
and agents fully comply, so that B = S and sp = a. Then, sp can be any rule from A and is adapted
to IP(p) = IA(p).
For expositional convenience, we consider the optimal choice of a treatment assignment sp
adapted to the agent’s information IA(p) constructed earlier. We will use the word “agents” to
refer to the decision maker in this problem, even though it can also apply to the planner’s de-
cision problem. An econometric approach to this problem is to estimate explicit dynamic choice
models with explicit choice-outcome relationships. One emphasis in the literature is on Markovian
discrete-choice models that satisfy Rust’s (1987) conditional-independence assumption (see Rust,
1994). Other assumptions are made in the literature and we exposit them in section 5.
Here, we explore the use of Rust’s (1987) model as a model of treatment choice in a dynamic
treatment-eﬀect setting. In particular, we make explicit the additional structure that Rust’s model,
and in particular his conditional-independence assumption, imposes on Robins’ dynamic potential-
outcomes model. We follow Rust (1987) and focus on a ﬁnite treatment (control) space S. In the
notation of our model, payoﬀs are determined by the outcomes Yp, treatment choices sp, the “cost
shocks” V , and the covariates Z. Rust (1987) assumes that {Yp(t − 1),Vt,Z} is a controlled ﬁrst-
order Markov process, with initial condition Yp(0) ≡ 0 and control sp.29 As before, Vt and Z are
not causally aﬀected by choices, but Yp(t) may causally depend on current and past choices. The






Υt{Yp(t − 1),Vt,sp(t),Z} + Υ ¯ T+1{Yp(¯ T),Z} IA(1)
3
5, (5)
for some (net and discounted) utility functions Υt and IA(1) = IA(1,p), which is independent of p.
Υ ¯ T+1{Yp(¯ T),Z} is the terminal value. Under standard regularity conditions on the utility functions,
we can solve backward for the optimal policy sp. Because of Rust’s Markov assumption, sp has a
Markovian structure,
sp(t)⊥ ⊥(Y t−2
p ,V t−1) | [Yp(t − 1),Vt,Z],
for t = 2,..., ¯ T, and {Yp(t − 1),Vt,Z} is a ﬁrst-order Markov process. Note that Z enters the
model as an observed (by the econometrician) factor that shifts net utility. A key assumption
embodied in the speciﬁcation of (5) is time-separability of utility. Rust (1987), in addition, imposes
separability between observed and unobserved state variables. This assumption plays no essential
role in expositing the core ideas in Rust, and we will not make it here.
Rust’s (1987) conditional-independence assumption imposes two key restrictions on the decision
problem. It is instructive to consider these restrictions in isolation from Rust’s Markov restriction.
We make the model’s causal structure explicit using the potential-outcomes notation. Note that the
model has a recursive causal structure— the payoﬀ-relevant state is controlled by current and past
29Rust (1987) assumes an inﬁnite-horizon, stationary environment. Here, we present a ﬁnite-horizon version to
facilitate a comparison with the dynamic potential-outcomes model and to link up with the analysis in section 5.
16choices only— and satisﬁes no-anticipation condition (NA). Setting Y (0,s) ≡ 0 for speciﬁcity, and
ignoring the Markov restriction, Rust’s conditional-independence assumption requires, in addition
to the assumption that there are no direct causal eﬀects of choices on V , that










for all s and t. As noted by Rust (1987, p. 1011), condition (6) ensures that the observed (by the
econometrician) controlled state evolves independently of the unobserved payoﬀ-relevant variables.
It is equivalent to (Florens and Mouchart, 1982)30
(M-3)
£
Y (s,t),...,Y (s, ¯ T)
¤




for all t and s.
In turn, (M-3) implies (M-1) and is equivalent to the assumption that (M-2) holds for all sp0.31
Condition (7) excludes serial dependence of the unobserved payoﬀ-relevant variables conditional
on past outcomes. In contrast, Robins’ g-computation framework allows for such serial depen-
dence, provided that sequential randomization holds if serial dependence is present. For example, if
V ⊥ ⊥U|Z, then (M-1) and its variants hold without further assumptions on the time series structure
of Vt.
The ﬁrst-order Markov assumption imposes additional restrictions on potential outcomes. These
restrictions are twofold. First, potential outcomes follow a ﬁrst-order Markov process. Second, s(t)
only directly aﬀects the Markov transition from Y (t,s) to Y (t + 1,s). This strengthens the no-
anticipation assumption presented in section 3.1.1. The Markov assumption also requires that Vt+1
only depends on Y (s,t), and not on Y t−1(s), given Y (s,t).
In applications, we may assume that actual treatment assignment S solves the Markovian deci-
sion problem. Together with speciﬁcations of Υt, this further restricts the dynamic choice-outcome
model. Alternatively, one could make other assumptions on S and use (5) to deﬁne and ﬁnd an
optimal, and typically counterfactual, assignment rule sp0.
Our analysis shows that the substantial econometric literature on the structural empirical analy-
sis of Markovian decision problems under conditional independence can be applied to policy evalua-
tion under sequential randomization. Conversely, methods developed for potential-outcomes models
with sequential randomization can be applied to learn about aspects of dynamic discrete-choice
models. Murphy (2003) develops methods to estimate an optimal treatment assignment rule using
Robins’ dynamic potential-outcomes model with sequential randomization (M-2).
3.3 The Information Structure of Policies
One concern about methods for policy evaluation based on the potential-outcomes model is that po-
tential outcomes are sometimes reduced-form representations of dynamic models of agent’s choices.
30Note that (6) is a Granger (1969) noncausality condition stating that, for all s and conditional on Z, V does not
cause Y (s).
31If V has redundant components, that is components that do not nontrivially enter any assignment rule sp, (M-3)
imposes more structure, but structure that is irrelevant to the decision problem and its empirical analysis.
17A policy maker choosing optimal policies typically faces a population of agents who act on the avail-
able information, and their actions in turn aﬀect potential outcomes. For example, in terms of the
model of section 3.2.2, a policy may change ﬁnancial incentives— the b ∈ B assigned through a could
enter the net utilities Υt— and leave it to the agents to control outcomes by choosing treatment. In
econometric policy evaluation, it is therefore important to carefully model the information IA that
accumulates to the agents in diﬀerent program states and under diﬀerent policies, separately from
the policy maker’s information IP.
This can be contrasted with common practice in biostatistics. Statistical analyses of the eﬀects
of drugs on health are usually concerned with the physician’s (planner’s) information and decision
problem. Gill and Robins’ (2001) sequential randomization assumption, for example, is often justiﬁed
by the assumption that physicians base their treatment decisions on observable (by the analyst)
information only. This literature, however, often ignores the possibility that many variables known
to the physician may not be known to the observing statistician and that the agents being given
drugs alter the protocols.
Potential outcomes will often depend on the agent’s information. Failure to correctly model
the information will often lead to violation of (NA) and failure of invariance. Potential outcomes
may therefore not be valid inputs in a policy evaluation study. A naive speciﬁcation of potential
outcomes would only index treatments by actual participation in, e.g., job search assistance or
training programs. Such a naive speciﬁcation is incomplete in the context of economies inhabited
by forward-looking agents who make choices that aﬀect outcomes. In specifying potential outcomes,
we should not only consider the eﬀects of actual program participation, but also the eﬀects of the
information available to agents about the program and policy. We now illustrate this point.
Example 2. Black, Smith, Berger, and Noel (2003) analyze the eﬀect of compulsory training and
employment services provided to unemployment insurance (UI) claimants in Kentucky on the exit
rate from UI and earnings. In the program they study, letters are sent out to notify agents some
time ahead whether they are selected to participate in the program. This information is recorded in
a database and available to them. They can analyze the letter as part of a program that consists of
information provision and subsequent participation in training. The main empirical ﬁnding of their
paper is that the threat of future mandatory training conveyed by the letters is more eﬀective in
increasing the UI exit rate than training itself.
The data used by Black, Smith, Berger, and Noel (2003) are atypical of many economic data
sets, because the data collectors carefully record the information provided to agents. This allows
Black et al. to analyze the eﬀects of the provision of information along with the eﬀects of actual
program participation. In many econometric applications, the information on the program under
study is less rich. Data sets may provide information on actual participation in training programs
and some background information on how the program is administered. Typically, however, the
data do not record all of the letters sent to agents and do not record every phone conversation
between administrators and agents. Then, the econometrician needs to make assumptions on how
this information accumulates for agents. In many applications, knowledge of speciﬁc institutional
mechanisms of assignment can be used to justify speciﬁc informational assumptions.
18Example 3. Abbring, Van den Berg, and Van Ours (2005) analyze the eﬀect of punitive beneﬁts
reductions, or sanctions, in Dutch UI on re-employment rates. In the Netherlands, UI claimants have
to comply with certain rules concerning search behavior and registration. If a claimant violates
these rules, a sanction may be applied. A sanction is a punitive reduction in beneﬁts for some
period of time and may be accompanied by increased levels of monitoring by the UI agency.32
Abbring, Van den Berg, and Van Ours (2005) use administrative data and know the re-employment
duration, the duration at which a sanction is imposed if a sanction is imposed, and some background
characteristics for each UI case.
Without prior knowledge of the Dutch UI system, an analyst might make a variety of informa-
tional assumptions. One extreme is that UI claimants know at the start of their UI spells that their
beneﬁts will be reduced at some speciﬁc duration if they are still claiming UI at that duration. This
results in a UI system with entitlement periods that are tailored to individual claimants and that
are set and revealed at the start of the UI spells. In this case, claimants will change their labor
market behavior from the start of their UI spell in response to the future beneﬁts reduction (e.g.,
Mortensen, 1977). At another extreme, claimants receive no prior signals of impending sanctions
and there are no anticipatory eﬀects of actual beneﬁts reductions. However, agents may still be
aware of the properties of the sanctions process and to some extent this will aﬀect their behavior.
Abbring, Van den Berg, and Van Ours (2005) analyze a search model with these features. Abbring
and Van den Berg (2003b) provide a structural example where the data cannot distinguish between
these two informational assumptions. Abbring, Van den Berg, and Van Ours (2005) use institutional
background information to argue in favor of the second informational assumption as the one that
characterizes their data.
If data on information provision are not available and simplifying assumptions on the program’s
information structure cannot be justiﬁed, the analyst needs to model the information that accu-
mulates to agents as an unobserved determinant of outcomes. This is the approach followed, and
further discussed, in section 5.
The information determining outcomes typically includes aspects of the policy. In Example 2,
the letter announcing future training will be interpreted diﬀerently in diﬀerent policy environments.
If agents are forward looking, the letter will be more informative under a policy that speciﬁes a
strong relation between the letter and mandatory training in the population than under a policy
that allocates letters and training independently. In Example 3, the policy is a monitoring regime.
Potential outcomes are UI durations under diﬀerent sanction times. A change in monitoring policy
changes the value of unemployment. In a job-search model with forward-looking agents, agents
will respond by changing their search eﬀort and reservation wages, and UI duration outcomes will
change. In either example, potential outcomes are not invariant to variation in the policy. In the
terminology of Hurwicz (1962), the policy is not “structural” with regard to potential outcomes and
violates the invariance assumptions presented in Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a). One must control
for the eﬀects of agents’ information.
32See Grubb (2000) for a review of sanction systems in the OECD.
193.4 Selection on Unobservables
In econometric program evaluations, (sequentially) randomized assignment is unlikely to hold. We
illustrate this in the models developed in section 5. Observational data are characterized by a lot
of heterogeneity among agents, as documented by the empirical examples in Abbring and Heckman
(2007) and in Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999). This heterogeneity is unlikely to be fully
captured by the observed variables in most data sets. In a dynamic context, such unmeasured
heterogeneity leads to violations of the assumptions of Gill and Robins (2001) and Rust (1987)
that choices represent a sequential randomization. This is true even if the unmeasured variables
only aﬀect the availability of slots in programs but not outcomes directly. If agents are rational,
forward-looking and observe at least some of the unmeasured variables that the econometrician does
not, they will typically respond to these variables through their choice of treatment and investment
behavior. In this case, the sequential randomization condition fails.
For the same reason, identiﬁcation based on instrumental variables is relatively hard to justify in
dynamic models (Hansen and Sargent, 1980; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000; Abbring and Van den
Berg, 2005). If the candidate instruments only vary across persons but not over time for the same
person, then they are not likely to be valid instruments because they aﬀect expectations and future
choices and may aﬀect current potential outcomes. Instead of using instrumental variables that vary
only across persons, we require instruments based on unanticipated person-speciﬁc shocks that aﬀect
treatment choices but not outcomes at each point in time. In the context of continuously assigned
treatments, the implied data requirements seem onerous. To achieve identiﬁcation, Abbring and
Van den Berg (2003b) focus on regressor variation rather than exclusion restrictions in a suﬃciently
smooth model of continuous-time treatment eﬀects. We discuss their analysis in section 4. Heckman
and Navarro (2007) show that curvature conditions, not exclusion restrictions, that result in the
same variables having diﬀerent eﬀects on choices and outcomes in diﬀerent periods, are motivated
by economic theory and can be exploited to identify dynamic treatment eﬀects in discrete time
without literally excluding any variables. We discuss their analysis in section 5. We now consider a
formulation of the analysis in continuous time.
4 The Event-History Approach to Policy Analysis
The discrete-time models just discussed in section 3 have an obvious limitation. Time is continuous
and many events are best described by a continuous-time model. There is a rich ﬁeld of continuous-
time event-history analysis that has been adapted to conduct policy evaluation analysis.33 For
example, the eﬀects of training and counseling on unemployment durations and job stability have
been analyzed by applying event-history methods to data on individual labor-market and training
histories (Ridder, 1986; Card and Sullivan, 1988; Gritz, 1993; Ham and LaLonde, 1996; Eberwein
et al., 1997; Bonnal et al., 1997). Similarly, the moral hazard eﬀects of unemployment insurance
have been studied by analyzing the eﬀects of time-varying beneﬁts on labor-market transitions (e.g.,
33Abbring and Van den Berg (2004) discuss the relation between the event-history approach to program evaluation
and more standard latent-variable and panel-data methods, with a focus on identiﬁcation issues.
20Meyer, 1990; Abbring et al., 2005; Van den Berg et al., 2004). In ﬁelds like epidemiology, the use
of event-history models to analyze treatment eﬀects is widespread (see, e.g., Andersen et al., 1993;
Keiding, 1999).
The event-history approach to program evaluation is ﬁrmly rooted in the econometric literature
on state dependence (lagged dependent variables) and heterogeneity (Heckman and Borjas, 1980;
and Heckman, 1981a). Event-history models along the lines of Heckman and Singer (1984, 1986)
are used to jointly model transitions into programs and transitions into outcome states. Causal
eﬀects of programs are modelled as the dependence of individual transition rates on the individual
history of program participation. Dynamic selection eﬀects are modelled by allowing for dependent
unobserved heterogeneity in both the program and outcome transition rates.
Without restrictions on the class of models considered, true state dependence and dynamic
selection eﬀects cannot be distinguished.34 Any history dependence of current transition rates can
be explained both as true state dependence and as the result of unobserved heterogeneity that
simultaneously aﬀects the history and current transitions. This is a dynamic manifestation of the
problem of drawing causal inference from observational data. In applied work, researchers avoid
this problem by imposing additional structure. A typical, simple, example is a mixed semi-Markov
model in which the causal eﬀects are restricted to program participation in the previous spell (e.g.,
Bonnal, Foug` ere, and S´ erandon, 1997). There is a substantial literature on the identiﬁability of
state-dependence eﬀects and heterogeneity in duration and event-history models that exploit such
additional structure (see Heckman and Taber, 1994, and Van den Berg, 2001 for reviews). Here, we
provide discussion of some canonical cases.
4.1 Treatment Eﬀects in Duration Models
4.1.1 Dynamically Assigned Binary Treatments and Duration Outcomes
We ﬁrst consider the simplest case of mutual dependence of events in continuous time, involving only
two binary events. This case is suﬃciently rich to capture the eﬀect of a dynamically assigned binary
treatment on a duration outcome. Binary events in continuous time can be fully characterized by
the time at which they occur and a structural model for their joint determination is a simultaneous-
equations model for durations. We develop such a model along the lines of Abbring and Van den
Berg (2003b). This model is an extension, with general marginal distributions and general causal
and spurious dependence of the durations, of Freund’s (1961) bivariate exponential model.
Consider two continuously-distributed random durations Y and S. We refer to one of the du-
rations, S, as the time to treatment and to the other duration, Y , as the outcome duration. Such
an asymmetry arises naturally in many applications. For example, in Abbring, Van den Berg, and
Van Ours’s (2005) study of unemployment insurance, the treatment is a punitive beneﬁts reduction
(sanction) and the outcome re-employment. The re-employment process continues after imposition
of a sanction, but the sanctions process is terminated by re-employment. The current exposition,
34See Heckman and Singer (1986).
21however, is symmetric and uniﬁes both cases. It applies to both the asymmetric setup of the sanc-
tions example and to applications in which both events may causally aﬀect the other event.
Let Y (s) be the potential outcome duration that would prevail if the treatment time is exter-
nally set to s. Similarly, let S(y) be the potential treatment time resulting from setting the outcome
duration to y. We assume that ex ante heterogeneity across agents is fully captured by observed
covariates X and unobserved covariates V , assumed to be external and temporally invariant. Treat-
ment causally aﬀects the outcome duration through its hazard rate. We denote the hazard rate of
Y (s) at time t for an agent with characteristics (X,V ) by θY (t|s,X,V ). Similarly, outcomes aﬀect
the treatment times through its hazard θS(t|y,X,V ). Causal eﬀects on hazard rates are produced by
recursive economic models driven by point processes, such as search models. We provide an example
below, and further discussion in section 4.3.
Without loss of generality, we partition V into (VS,VY ) and assume that θY (t|s,X,V ) =
θY (t|s,X,VY ) and θS(t|y,X,V ) = θS(t|y,X,VS). Intuitively, VS and VY are the unobservables af-
fecting, respectively, treatment and outcome, and the joint distribution of (VS,VY ) is unrestricted.
In particular, VS and VY may have elements in common.
The corresponding integrated hazard rates are deﬁned by ΘY (t | s,X,VY ) =
R t
0 θY (u | s,X,VY )du
and ΘS(t | y,X,VS) =
R t
0 θS(u | y,X,VS)du. For expositional convenience, we assume that these in-
tegrated hazards are strictly increasing in t. We also assume that they diverge to ∞ as t → ∞, so that
the duration distributions are non-defective.35 Then, ΘY (Y (s) | s,X,VY ) and ΘS(S(y) | y,X,VS)
are unit exponential for all y,s ∈ R+.36 This implies the following model of potential outcomes and
treatments,37
Y (s) = y(s,X,VY ,εY ) and S(y) = s(y,X,VS,εS),
for some unit exponential random variables εY and εS that are independent of (X,V ), y = Θ−1
Y ,
and s = Θ−1
S .
The exponential errors εY and εS embody the ex post shocks that are inherent to the individual
hazard processes, that is the randomness in the transition process after conditioning on covariates
X and V and survival. We assume that εY ⊥ ⊥εS, so that {Y (s)} and {S(y)} are only dependent
through the observed and unobserved covariates (X,V ). This conditional-independence assumption
is weaker than the conditional-independence assumption underlying the analysis of section 3 and
35Abbring and Van den Berg (2003b) allow for defective distributions, which often have structural interpretations.
For example, some women never have children and some workers will never leave a job. See Abbring (2002) for
discussion.
36Let T | X be distributed with density f(t|X), non-defective cumulative distribution function F(t|X), and hazard
rate θ(t|X) = f(t|X)/[1−F(t|X)]. Then,
R T
0 θ(t|X)dt = −ln[1−F(T|X)] is a unit exponential random variable that
is independent of X.
37The causal hazard model only implies that the distributions of εY and εS are invariant across assigned treatments
and outcomes, respectively; their realizations may not be. This is suﬃcient for the variation of y(s,X,VY ,εY ) with
s and of s(y,X,VS,εS) with y to have a causal interpretation. The further restriction that the random variables εY
and εS are invariant is made for simplicity, and is empirically innocuous. See Abbring and Van den Berg (2003b) for
details and Freedman (2004) for discussion.
22used in matching, because it allows for conditioning on the invariant unobservables V . It shares this
feature with the discrete-time models developed in section 5.
We assume a version of the no-anticipation condition of section 3.1.1: for all t ∈ R+,
θY (t|s,X,VY ) = θY (t|s0,X,VY ) and θS(t|y,X,VS) = θS(t|y0,X,VS)
for all s,s0,y,y0 ∈ [t,∞). This excludes eﬀects of anticipation of the treatment on the outcome.
Similarly, there can be no anticipation eﬀects of future outcomes on the treatment time hazard.
Example 4. Consider a standard search model describing the job search behavior of an unemployed
individual (e.g., Mortensen, 1986) with characteristics (X,V ). Job oﬀers arrive at a rate λ > 0 and
are random draws from a given distribution F. Both λ and F may depend on (X,V ), but, for
notational simplicity, we suppress all explicit representations of conditioning on (X,V ) throughout
this example. An oﬀer is either accepted or rejected. A rejected oﬀer cannot be recalled at a later
time. The individual initially receives a constant ﬂow of unemployment-insurance beneﬁts. However,
the individual faces the risk of a sanction— a permanent reduction of his beneﬁts to some lower,
constant level— at some point during his unemployment spell. During the unemployment spell,
sanctions arrive independently of the job-oﬀer process at a constant rate µ > 0. The individual
cannot foresee the exact time a sanction is imposed, but he knows the distribution of these times.38
The individual chooses a job-acceptance rule so as to maximize his expected discounted lifetime
income. Under standard conditions, this is a reservation-wage rule: at time t, the individual accepts
each wage of w(t) or higher. The corresponding re-employment hazard rate is λ(1−F(w(t))). Apart
from the sanction, which is not foreseen and arrives at a constant rate during the unemployment
spell, the model is stationary. This implies that the reservation wage is constant, say equal to w0,
up to and including time s, jumps to some lower level w1 < w0 at time s and stays constant at w1
for the remainder of the unemployment spell if beneﬁts would be reduced at time s.
The model is a version of the simultaneous-equations model for durations. To see this, let Y be
the re-employment duration and S the sanction time. The potential-outcome hazards are
θY (t|s) =
(
λ0 if 0 ≤ t ≤ s
λ1 if t > s,
where λ0 = λ[1 − F(w0)] and λ1 = λ[1 − F(w1)], and clearly λ1 ≥ λ0. Similarly, the potential-
treatment time hazards are θS(t|y) = µ if 0 ≤ t ≤ y, and 0 otherwise. Note that the no-anticipation
condition follows naturally from the recursive structure of the economic decision problem in this
case, in which we have properly accounted for all relevant components of agent information sets.
Furthermore, the assumed independence of the job oﬀer and sanction processes at the individual
level for given (X,V ) implies that εY ⊥ ⊥εS.
The actual outcome and treatment are related to the potential outcomes and treatments by S =
S(Y ) and Y = Y (S). The no-anticipation assumption ensures that this system has a unique solution
38This is a rudimentary version of the search model with punitive beneﬁts reductions, or sanctions, of Abbring,
Van den Berg, and Van Ours (2005). The main diﬀerence is that in the present version of the model the sanctions
process cannot be controlled by the agent.
23(Y,S) by imposing a recursive structure on the underlying transition processes. Without anticipation
eﬀects, current treatment and outcome hazards only depend on past outcome and treatment events,
and the transition processes evolve recursively (Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003b). Together with
a distribution G(· | X) of V | X, this gives a non-parametric structural model of the distribution of
(Y,S) | X that embodies general simultaneous causal dependence of Y and S, dependence of (Y,X)
on observed covariates X, and general dependence of the unobserved errors VY and VS.
There are two reasons for imposing further restrictions on this model. First, it is not identiﬁed
from data on (Y,S,X). Take a version of the model with selection on unobservables (VY ⊥ ⊥ / VS | X)
and consider the distribution of (Y,S)|X generated by this version of the model. Then, there exists
an alternative version of the model that satisﬁes both no-anticipation and VY ⊥ ⊥VS | X, and that
generates the same distribution of (Y,S)|X (Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003b, Proposition 1). In
other words, for each version of the model with selection on unobservables and anticipation eﬀects,
there is an observationally-equivalent model version that satisﬁes no-anticipation and conditional
randomization. This is a version of the nonidentiﬁcation result discussed in section 3.1.
Second, even if we ensure nonparametric identiﬁcation by assuming no-anticipation and con-
ditional randomization, we cannot learn about the agent-level causal eﬀects embodied in y and s
without imposing even further restrictions. At best, under regularity conditions we can identify
θY (t|s,X) = E[θY (t|s,X,VY )|X,Y (s) ≥ t] and θS(t|y,X) = E[θS(t|y,X,VS)|X,S(y) ≥ t] from
standard hazard regressions (e.g., Andersen et al., 1993; Fleming and Harrington, 1991). Thus, we
can identify the distributions of Y (s)|X and S(y)|X, and therefore solve the selection problem if we
are only interested in these distributions. However, if we are also interested in the causal eﬀects on
the corresponding hazard rates for given X,V , we face an additional dynamic selection problem. The
hazards of the identiﬁed distributions of Y (s)|X and S(y)|X only condition on observed covariates
X, and not on unobserved covariates V , and are confounded with dynamic selection eﬀects (Heck-
man and Borjas, 1980; Heckman and Singer, 1986; Meyer, 1996; Abbring and Van den Berg, 2005).
For example, the diﬀerence between θY (t|s,X) and θY (t|s0,X) does not only reﬂect agent-level dif-
ferences between θY (t|s,X,VY ) and θY (t|s0,X,VY ), but also diﬀerences in the subpopulations of
survivors {X,Y (s) ≥ t} and {X,Y (s0) ≥ t} on which the hazards are computed.
In the next two subsections, we discuss what can be learned about treatment eﬀects in duration
models under additional model restrictions. We take the no-anticipation assumption as fundamental.
As explained in section 3, this requires that we measure and include in our model all relevant
information needed to deﬁne potential outcomes. However, we relax the randomization assumption.
We ﬁrst consider Abbring and Van den Berg’s (2003b) analysis of identiﬁcation without exclusion
restrictions. They argue that these results are useful, because exclusion restrictions are hard to
justify in an inherently dynamic setting with forward-looking agents. Abbring and Van den Berg
(2005) further clarify this issue by studying inference for treatment eﬀects in duration models using
a social experiment. We discuss what can be learned from such experiments at the end of this
section.
244.1.2 Identiﬁability Without Exclusion Restrictions
Abbring and Van den Berg consider an extension of the multivariate Mixed Proportional Hazard
(MPH) model (Lancaster, 1979) in which the hazard rates of Y (s) | (X,V ) and S(y) | (X,V ) are
given by
θY (t | s,X,V ) =
(
λY (t)φY (X)VY if t ≤ s
λY (t)φY (X)δY (t,s,X)VY if t > s
(8)
and
θS(t | y,X,V ) =
(
λS(t)φS(X)VS if t ≤ y
λS(t)φS(X)δS(t,y,X)VS if t > y,
(9)
respectively, and V = (VS,VY ) is distributed independently of X. The baseline hazards λY : R+ →
(0,∞) and λS : R+ → (0,∞) capture duration dependence of the individual transition rates. The
integrated hazards are ΛY (t) =
R t
0 λY (τ)dτ < ∞ and ΛS(t) =
R t
0 λS(τ)dτ < ∞ for all t ∈ R+.
The regressor functions φY : X → (0,∞) and φS : X → (0,∞) are assumed to be continuous,
with X ⊂ Rq the support of X. In empirical work, these functions are frequently speciﬁed as
φY (x) = exp(x0βY ) and φS(x) = exp(x0βS) for some parameter vectors βY and βS. We will not
make such parametric assumptions. Note that the fact that both regressor functions are deﬁned on
the same domain X is not restrictive, because each function φY and φS can “select” certain elements
of X by being trivial functions of the other elements. In the parametric example, the vector βY
would only have nonzero elements for those regressors that matter to the outcome hazard. The
functions δY and δS capture the causal eﬀects. Note that δY (t,s,X) only enters θY (t | s,X,V ) at
durations t > s, so that the model satisﬁes no anticipation of treatment assumption (NA). Similarly,
it satisﬁes no anticipation of outcomes and has a recursive causal structure as required by the no-
anticipation assumption. If δY = 1, treatment is ineﬀective; if δY is larger than 1, it stochastically
reduces the remaining outcome duration.
Note that this model allows δY and δS to depend on elapsed duration t, past endogenous events,
and the observed covariates X, but not on V . Abbring and Van den Berg also consider an alter-
native model that allows δY and δS to depend on unobservables in a general way, but not on past
endogenous events.
Abbring and Van den Berg show that these models are nonparametrically identiﬁed from single-
spell data under the conditions for the identiﬁcation of competing-risks models based on the mul-
tivariate MPH model given by Abbring and Van den Berg (2003a). Among other conditions are
the requirements that there is some independent local variation of the regressor eﬀects in both
hazard rates and a ﬁnite-mean restriction on V , which are standard in the analysis of multivariate
MPH models. With multiple-spell data, most of these assumptions, and the MPH structure, can be
relaxed (Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003b).
The models can be parameterized in a ﬂexible way and estimated by maximum likelihood.
Typical parameterizations involve linear-index structures for the regressor and causal eﬀects, a
discrete distribution G, and piecewise-constant baseline hazards λS and λY . Abbring and Van den
Berg (2003c) develop a simple graphical method for inference on the sign of ln(δY ) in the absence
25of regressors. Abbring, Van den Berg, and Van Ours (2005) present an empirical application.
4.1.3 Inference Based on Instrumental Variables
The concerns expressed in subsection 3.4 about the validity of exclusion restrictions in dynamic
settings carry over to event-history models.
Example 5. A good illustration of this point is oﬀered by the analysis of Eberwein, Ham, and
LaLonde (1997), who study the eﬀects of a training program on labor-market transitions. Their
data are particularly nice, as potential participants are randomized into treatment and control
groups at some baseline point in time. This allows them to estimate the eﬀect of intention to treat
(with training) on subsequent labor-market transitions. This is directly relevant to policy evaluation
in the case that the policy involves changing training enrollment through oﬀers of treatment which
may or may not be accepted by agents.
However, Eberwein et al. are also interested in the eﬀect of actual participation in the training
program on post program labor-market transitions. This is a distinct problem, because compliance
with the intention-to-treat protocol is imperfect. Some agents in the control group are able to enroll
in substitute programs, and some agents in the treatment group choose never to enroll in a program
at all. Moreover, actual enrollment does not take place at the baseline time, but is dispersed over
time. Those in the treatment group are more likely to enroll earlier. This fact, coupled with the
initial randomization, suggests that the intention-to-treat indicator might be used as an instrument
for identifying the eﬀect of program participation on employment and unemployment spells.
The dynamic nature of enrollment into the training program, and the event-history focus of
the analysis complicate matters considerably. Standard instrumental-variables methods cannot be
directly applied. Instead, Eberwein et al. use a parametric duration model for pre and post program
outcomes that excludes the intention-to-treat indicator from directly determining outcomes. They
specify a duration model for training enrollment that includes an intention-to-treat indicator as an
explanatory variable, and specify a model for labor-market transitions that excludes the intention-to-
treat indicator and imposes a no-anticipation condition on the eﬀect of actual training participation
on labor-market transitions. Such a model is consistent with an environment in which agents cannot
perfectly foresee the actual training time they will be assigned and in which they do not respond
to information about this time revealed by their assignment to an intention-to-treat group. This is
a strong assumption. In a search model with forward-looking agents, for example, such information
would typically aﬀect the ex ante values of unemployment and employment. Then, it would aﬀect
the labor-market transitions before actual training enrollment through changes in search eﬀorts
and reservation wages, unless these are both assumed to be exogenous. An assumption of perfect
foresight on the part of the agents being studied only complicates matters further.
Abbring and Van den Berg (2005) study what can be learned about dynamically assigned
programs from social experiments if the intention-to-treat instrument cannot be excluded from the
outcome equation. They develop bounds, tests for unobserved heterogeneity, and point-identiﬁcation
26results that extend those discussed in this section.39
4.2 Treatment Eﬀects in More General Event-History Models
It is instructive to place the causal duration models developed in section 4.1 in the more general
setting of event-history models with state dependence and heterogeneity. We do this following
Abbring’s (2008) analysis of the mixed semi-Markov model.
4.2.1 The Mixed Semi-Markov Event-History Model
The model is formulated in a fashion that is analogous to the frameworks of Heckman and Singer
(1986). The point of departure is a continuous-time stochastic process assuming values in a ﬁnite
set S at each point in time. We will interpret realizations of this process as agents’ event histories
of transitions between states in the state space S.
Suppose that event histories start at real-valued random times T0 in an S-valued random state
S0, and that subsequent transitions occur at random times T1,T2,... such that T0 < T1 < T2 < ···.
Let Sl be the random destination state of the transition at Tl. Taking the sample paths of the
event-history process to be right-continuous, we have that Sl is the state occupied in the interval
[Tl,Tl+1).
Suppose that heterogeneity among agents is captured by vectors of time-constant observed co-
variates X and unobserved covariates V .40 In this case, state dependence in the event-history process
for given individual characteristics X,V has a causal interpretation.41 We structure such state de-
pendence by assuming that the event-history process conditional on X,V is a time-homogeneous
semi-Markov process. Conditional on X,V the length of a spell in a state and the destination state
of the transition ending that spell depend only on the past through the current state. In our no-
tation, (∆Tl,Sl)⊥ ⊥{(Ti,Si),i = 0,...,l − 1} | Sl−1,X,V , where ∆Tl = Tl − Tl−1 is the length of
spell l. Also, the distribution of (∆Tl,Sl)|Sl−1,X,V does not depend on l. Note that, conditional
on X,V , {Sl,l ≥ 0} is a time-homogeneous Markov chain under these assumptions.
Non-trivial dynamic selection eﬀects arise because V is not observed. The event-history process
conditional on observed covariates X only is a mixed semi-Markov process. If V aﬀects the initial
state S0, or transitions from it, subpopulations of agents in diﬀerent states at some time t typically
have diﬀerent distributions of the unobserved characteristics V . Therefore, a comparison of the
subsequent transitions in two such subpopulations does not only reﬂect state dependence, but also
sorting of agents with diﬀerent unobserved characteristics into the diﬀerent states they occupy at
time t.
39In the special case that a static treatment, or treatment plan, is assigned at the start of the spell, standard
instrumental-variables methods may be applied. See Abbring and Van den Berg (2005).
40We restrict attention to time-invariant observed covariates for expositional convenience. The analysis can easily
be adapted to more general time-varying external covariates. Restricting attention to time-constant regressors is a
worst-case scenario for identiﬁcation. External time variation in observed covariates aids identiﬁcation (Heckman and
Taber, 1994).
41We could make this explicit by extending the potential-outcomes model of section 4.1.2 to the general event-history
setup. However, this would add a lot of complexity, but little extra insight.
27We model {(∆Tl,Sl),l ≥ 1}|T0,S0,X,V as a repeated competing-risks model. Due to the mixed
semi-Markov assumption, the latent durations corresponding to transitions into the possible desti-
nation states in the lth spell only depend on the past through the current state Sl−1, conditional
on X,V . This implies that we can fully specify the repeated competing-risks model by specifying
a set of origin-destination-speciﬁc latent durations, with corresponding transition rates. Let Tl
jk
denote the latent duration corresponding to the transition from state j to state k in spell l. We
explicitly allow for the possibility that transitions between certain (ordered) pairs of states may
be impossible. To this end, deﬁne the correspondence Q : S → σ(S) assigning to each s ∈ S the
set of all destination states to which transitions are made from s with positive probability.42 Here,
σ(S) is the set of all subsets of S (the “power set” of S). Then, the length of spell l is given by
∆Tl = mins∈Q(Sl−1) Tl
Sl−1s, and the destination state by Sl = argmins∈Q(Sl−1) Tl
Sl−1s.
We take the latent durations to be mutually independent, jointly independent of T0,S0, and
identically distributed across spells l, all conditional on X,V . This reﬂects both the mixed semi-
Markov assumption and the additional assumption that all dependence between the latent du-
rations corresponding to the competing risks in a given spell l is captured by the observed re-
gressors X and the unobservables V . This is a standard assumption in econometric duration
analysis, which, with the semi-Markov assumption, allows us to characterize the distribution of
{(∆Tl,Sl),l ≥ 1}|T0,S0,X,V by specifying origin-destination-speciﬁc hazards θjk(t|X,V ) for the
marginal distributions of Tl
jk|X,V .
We assume that the hazards θjk(t|X,V ) are of the mixed proportional hazard (MPH) type:43
θjk(t|X,V ) =
(
λjk(t)φjk(X)Vjk if k ∈ Q(j)
0 otherwise.
(10)
The baseline hazards λjk : R+ → (0,∞) have integrated hazards Λjk(t) =
R t
0 λjk(τ)dτ < ∞, for
all t ∈ R+. The regressor functions φjk : X → (0,∞) are assumed to be continuous. Finally, the
(0,∞)-valued random variable Vjk is the scalar component of V that aﬀects the transition from
state j to state k. Note that we allow for general dependence between the components of V . This
way, we can capture, for example, that agents with lower re-employment rates have higher training
enrolment rates.
This model fully characterizes the distribution of the transitions {(∆Tl,Sl),l ≥ 1} conditional
on the initial conditions T0,S0 and the agent’s characteristics X,V . A complete model of the event
histories {(Tl,Sl),l ≥ 0} conditional on X,V would in addition require a speciﬁcation of the initial
conditions T0,S0 for given X,V . It is important to stress here that T0,S0 are the initial conditions of
the event-history process itself, and should not be confused with the initial conditions in a particular
sample (which we will discuss below). In empirical work, interest in the dependence between start
times T0 and characteristics X,V is often limited to the observation that the distribution of agents’
42Throughout this section, we assume that Q is known. It is important to note, however, that Q can actually be
identiﬁed trivially in all cases considered.
43Proportionality can be relaxed if we have data on suﬃciently long event-histories. See Honor´ e (1993) and Abbring
and Van den Berg (2003a,b) for related arguments for various multi-spell duration models.
28characteristics may vary over cohorts indexed by T0. The choice of initial state S0 may in general
be of some interest, but is often trivial. For example, we could model labor-market histories from
the calendar time T0 at which agents turn 15 onwards. In an economy with perfect compliance to
a mandatory schooling up to age 15, the initial state S0 would be “(mandatory) schooling” for all.
Therefore, we will not consider a model of the event history’s initial conditions, but instead focus
on the conditional model of subsequent transition histories.
Because of the semi-Markov assumption, the distribution of {(∆Tl,Sl),l ≥ 1}| T0,S0,X,V only
depends on S0, and not T0. Thus, T0 only aﬀects observed event histories through cohort eﬀects
on the distribution of unobserved characteristics V . The initial state S0, on the other hand, may
both have causal eﬀects on subsequent transitions and be informative on the distribution of V . For
expositional clarity, we assume that V ⊥ ⊥(T0,S0,X). This is true, for example, if all agents start in
the same state, so that S0 is degenerate, and V is independent of the start date T0 and the observed
covariates X.
An econometric model for transition histories conditional on the observed covariates X can be
derived from the model of {(∆Tl,Sl),l ≥ 1}|S0,X,V by integrating out V . The exact way this should
be done depends on the sampling scheme used. Here, we focus on sampling from the population
of event-histories. We assume that we observe the covariates X, the initial state S0, and the ﬁrst
¯ L transitions from there. Then, we can model these transitions for given S0,X by integrating the
conditional model over the distribution of V .
Abbring (2008) discusses more complex, and arguably more realistic, sampling schemes. For
example, when studying labor-market histories we may randomly sample from the stock of the
unemployed at a particular point in time. Because the unobserved component V aﬀects the proba-
bility of being unemployed at the sampling date, the distribution of V |X in the stock sample does
not equal its population distribution. This is again a dynamic version of the selection problem.
Moreover, in this case, we typically do not observe an agent’s entire labor-market history from
T0 onwards. Instead, we may have data on the time spent in unemployment at the sampling date
and on labor-market transitions for some period after the sampling date. This “initial-conditions
problem” complicates matters further (Heckman, 1981b).
In the next two subsections, we ﬁrst discuss some examples of applications of the model and
then review a basic identiﬁcation result for the simple sampling scheme above.
4.2.2 Applications to Program Evaluation
Several empirical papers study the eﬀect of a single treatment on some outcome duration or set of
transitions. Two approaches can be distinguished. In the ﬁrst approach, the outcome and treatment
processes are explicitly and separately speciﬁed. The second approach distinguishes treatment as
one state within a single event-history model with state dependence.
The ﬁrst approach is used in a variety of papers in labor economics. Eberwein, Ham, and
LaLonde (1997) specify a model for labor market transitions in which the transition intensities
between various labor market states (not including treatment) depend on whether someone has been
assigned to a training program in the past or not. Abbring, Van den Berg, and Van Ours (2005)
29and Van den Berg, Van der Klaauw, and Van Ours (2004) specify a model for re-employment
durations in which the re-employment hazard depends on whether a punitive beneﬁts reduction
has been imposed in the past. Similarly, Van den Berg, Holm, and Van Ours (2002) analyze the
duration up to transition into medical trainee positions and the eﬀect of an intermediate transition
into a medical assistant position (a “stepping-stone job”) on this duration. In all of these papers,
the outcome model is complemented with a hazard model for treatment choice.
These models ﬁt into the framework of section 4.1.2 or a multi-state extension thereof. We can
rephrase the class of models discussed in section 4.1.2 in terms of a simple event-history model with
state-dependence as follows. Distinguish three states, untreated (O), treated (P) and the exit state
of interest (E), so that S = {O,P,E}. All subjects start in O, so that S0 = O. Obviously, we do
not want to allow for all possible transitions between these three states. Instead, we restrict the





{P,E} s = O,
{E} if s = P,
∅ s = E.
State dependence of the transition rates into E captures treatment eﬀects in the sense of sec-
tion 4.1.2. Not all models in Abbring and Van den Berg (2003b) are included in the semi-Markov
setup discussed here. In particular, in this paper we do not allow the transition rate from P to E to
depend on the duration spent in O. This extension with “lagged duration dependence”(Heckman
and Borjas, 1980) would be required to capture one variant of their model.
The model for transitions from “untreated” (O) is a competing risks model, with program
enrolment (transition to P) and employment (E) competing to end the untreated spell. If the
unobservable factor VOE that determines transitions to employment and the unobservable factor
VOP aﬀecting program enrolment are dependent, then program enrolment is selective in the sense
that the initial distribution of VOE— and also typically that of VPE— among those who enroll at
a given point in time does not equal its distribution among survivors in O up to that time.44
The second approach is used by Gritz (1993) and Bonnal, Foug` ere, and S´ erandon (1997), among
others. Consider the following simpliﬁed setup. Suppose workers are either employed (E), unem-
ployed (O), or engaged in a training program (P). We can now specify a transition process among
these three labor market states in which a causal eﬀect of training on unemployment and employ-
ment durations is modeled as dependence of the various transition rates on the past occurrence
of a training program in the labor market history. Bonnal, Foug` ere, and S´ erandon (1997) only
have limited information on agents’ labor-market histories before the sample period. Partly to
avoid diﬃcult initial-conditions problems, they restrict attention to “ﬁrst order lagged occurrence
dependence” (Heckman and Borjas, 1980) by assuming that transition rates only depend on the
current and previous states occupied. Such a model is not directly covered by the semi-Markov
model, but with a simple augmentation of the state space it can be covered. In particular, we
44Note that, in addition, the survivors in O themselves are a selected subpopulation. Because V aﬀects survival in
O, the distribution of V among survivors in O is not equal to its population distribution.
30have to include lagged states in the state space on which the transition process is deﬁned. Because
there is no lagged state in the event-history’s ﬁrst spell, initial states should be deﬁned separately.
So, instead of just distinguishing states in S∗ = {E,O,P}, we distinguish augmented states in
S = {(s,s0) ∈ (S∗∪{I})×S∗ : s 6= s0}. Then, (I,s), s ∈ S∗, denote the initial states, and (s,s0) ∈ S
the augmented state of an agent who is currently in s0 and came from s 6= s0. In order to preserve
the interpretation of the model as a model of lagged occurrence dependence, we have to exclude
certain transitions by specifying
Q(s,s0) = {(s0,s00),s00 ∈ S∗\{s0}}.
This excludes transitions to augmented states that are labeled with a lagged state diﬀerent from
the origin state. Also, it ensures that agents never return to an initial state. For example, from
the augmented state (O,P)— previously unemployed and currently enrolled in a program— only
transitions to augmented states (P,s00)— previously enrolled in a program and currently in s00— are
possible. Moreover, it is not possible to be currently employed and transiting to initially unemployed,
(I,O). Rather, an employed person who loses her job would transit to (E,O)— currently unemployed
and previously employed.
The eﬀects are now modeled as simple state-dependence eﬀects. For example, the eﬀect of
training on the transition rate from unemployment to employment is simply the contrast between
the individual transition rate from (E,O) to (O,E) and the transition rate from (P,O) to (O,E).
Dynamic selection into the augmented states (E,O) and (P,O), as speciﬁed by the transition model,
confounds the empirical analysis of these training eﬀects. Note that due to the fact that we have
restricted attention to ﬁrst-order lagged occurrence dependence, there are no longer-run eﬀects of
training on transition rates from unemployment to employment.
4.2.3 Identiﬁcation Without Exclusion Restrictions
In this section, we state a basic identiﬁcation result for the following sampling scheme. Suppose
that the economist randomly samples from the population of event-histories, and that we observe
the ﬁrst ¯ L transitions (including destinations) for each sampled event-history, with the possibility
that ¯ L = ∞.45 Thus, we observe a random sample of {(Tl,Sl),l ∈ {0,1,..., ¯ L}}, and X.
First note that we can only identify the determinants of θjk for transitions (j,k) that occur
with positive probability among the ﬁrst ¯ L transitions. Moreover, without further restrictions, we
can only identify the joint distribution of a vector of unobservables corresponding to (part of) a
sequence of transitions that can be observed among the ﬁrst ¯ L transitions.
With this qualiﬁcation, identiﬁcation can be proved by extending Abbring and Van den Berg’s
(2003a) analysis of the MPH competing risks model to the present setting. This analysis assumes
that transition rates have an MPH functional form. Identiﬁcation again requires speciﬁc moments
of V to be ﬁnite, and independent local variation in the regressor eﬀects.
45Note that this assumes away econometric initial-conditions problems of the type previously discussed.
314.3 A Structural Perspective
Without further restrictions, the causal duration model of section 4.1.1 is versatile. It can be gen-
erated as the reduced form of a wide variety of continuous-time economic models driven by point
processes. Leading examples are sequential job-search models in which job-oﬀer arrival rates, and
other model parameters, depend on agent characteristics (X,V ) and policy interventions (see, e.g.,
Mortensen, 1986, and Example 4).
The MPH restriction on this model, however, is hard to justify from economic theory. In par-
ticular, nonstationary job-search models often imply interactions between duration and covariate
eﬀects; the MPH model only results under strong assumptions (Heckman and Singer, 1986; Van den
Berg, 2001). Similarly, an MPH structure is hard to generate from models in which agents learn
about their individual value of the model’s structural parameters, that is about (X,V ), through
Bayesian updating.
An alternative class of continuous-time models, not discussed in this chapter, speciﬁes durations
as the ﬁrst time some Gaussian or more general process crosses a threshold. Such models are closely
related to a variety of dynamic economic models. They have attracted recent attention in statistics
(see, e.g., Aalen and Gjessing, 2004). Abbring (2007) analyzes identiﬁability of “mixed hitting-time
models”, continuous-time threshold-crossing models in which the parameters depend on observed
and unobserved covariates, and discusses their link with optimizing models in economics. This is a
relatively new area of research, and a full development is beyond the scope of this paper. It extends to
a continuous-time framework the dynamic threshold crossing model developed in Heckman (1981a,b)
that is used in the next subsection of this chapter.
We now discuss a complementary discrete-time approach where it is possible to make many
important economic distinctions that are diﬃcult to make in the setting of continuous-time models
and to avoid some diﬃcult measure-theoretic problems. In the structural version, it is possible to
specify precisely agent information sets in a fashion that is not possible in conventional duration
models.
5 Dynamic Discrete Choice and Dynamic Treatment Eﬀects
Heckman and Navarro (2007) and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2007) present econometric mod-
els for analyzing time to treatment and the consequences of the choice of a particular treatment
time. Treatment may be a medical intervention, stopping schooling, opening a store, conducting an
advertising campaign at a given date or renewing a patent. Associated with each treatment time,
there can be multiple outcomes. They can include a vector of health status indicators and biomark-
ers; lifetime employment and earnings consequences of stopping at a particular grade of schooling;
the sales revenue and proﬁt generated from opening a store at a certain time; the revenues generated
and market penetration gained from an advertising campaign; or the value of exercising an option
at a given time. Heckman and Navarro (2007) unite and contribute to the literatures on dynamic
discrete choice and dynamic treatment eﬀects. For both classes of models, they present semipara-
metric identiﬁcation analyses. We summarize their work in this section. It is formulated in discrete
32time, which facilitates the speciﬁcation of richer unobserved and observed covariate processes than
those entertained in the continuous-time framework of Abbring and Van den Berg (2003b).
Heckman and Navarro extend the literature on treatment eﬀects to model choices of treatment
times and the consequences of choice and link the literature on treatment eﬀects to the literature
on precisely formulated structural dynamic discrete-choice models generated from index models
crossing thresholds. They show the value of precisely formulated economic models in extracting the
information sets of agents, in providing model identiﬁcation, in generating the standard treatment
eﬀects and in enforcing the nonanticipating behavior condition (NA) discussed in section 3.1.46
They establish the semiparametric identiﬁability of a class of dynamic discrete-choice models
for stopping times and associated outcomes in which agents sequentially update the information on
which they act. They also establish identiﬁability of a new class of reduced-form duration models that
generalize conventional discrete-time duration models to produce frameworks with much richer time
series properties for unobservables and general time-varying observables and patterns of duration
dependence than conventional duration models. Their analysis of identiﬁcation of these generalized
models requires richer variation driven by observables than is needed in the analysis of the more
restrictive conventional models. However, it does not require conventional period-by-period exclusion
restrictions, which are often diﬃcult to justify. Instead, they rely on curvature restrictions across
the index functions generating the durations that can be motivated by dynamic economic theory.47
Their methods can be applied to a variety of outcome measures including durations.
The key to their ability to identify structural models is that they supplement information on stop-
ping times or time to treatment with additional information on measured consequences of choices
of time to treatment as well as measurements. The dynamic discrete-choice literature surveyed in
Rust (1994) and Magnac and Thesmar (2002) focuses on discrete-choice processes with general
preferences and state vector evolution equations, typically Markovian in nature. Rust’s 1994 paper
contains negative results on nonparametric identiﬁcation of discrete-choice processes. Magnac and
Thesmar (2002) present some positive results on nonparametric identiﬁcation if certain parameters
or distributions of unobservables are assumed to be known. Heckman and Navarro (2007) produce
positive results on nonparametric identiﬁcation of a class of dynamic discrete-choice models based
on expected income maximization developed in labor economics by Flinn and Heckman (1982),
Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1999). These frameworks are dynamic versions
of the Roy model. Heckman and Navarro (2007) show how use of cross-equation restrictions joined
with data on supplementary measurement systems can undo Rust’s nonidentiﬁcation result. We
exposit their work and the related literature in this section. With their structural framework, they
can distinguish objective outcomes from subjective outcomes (valuations by the decision maker) in a
dynamic setting. Applying their analysis to health economics, they can identify the causal eﬀects on
health of a medical treatment as well as the associated subjective pain and suﬀering of a treatment
46Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005), Heckman, Tobias, and Vytlacil (2001, 2003), Carneiro, Hansen, and
Heckman (2001, 2003) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) show how standard treatment eﬀects can be generated from
structural models.
47See Heckman and Honor´ e (1989) for examples of such an identiﬁcation strategy in duration models. See also
Cameron and Heckman (1998).
33regime for the patient.48 Attrition decisions also convey information about agent preferences about
treatment.49
They do not rely on the assumption of conditional independence of unobservables with outcomes,
given observables, that is used throughout much of the dynamic discrete-choice literature and the
dynamic treatment literature surveyed in section 3.50 As noted in section 2, sequential conditional
independence assumptions underlie recent work on reduced-form dynamic treatment eﬀects.51 The
semiparametric analysis of Heckman and Navarro (2007) based on factors generalizes matching to a
dynamic setting. In their paper, some of the variables that would produce conditional independence
and would justify matching if they were observed, are treated as unobserved match variables. They
are integrated out and their distributions are identiﬁed.52 They consider two classes of models. We
review both.
5.1 Semiparametric Duration Models and Counterfactuals
Heckman and Navarro (2007), henceforth HN, develop a semiparametric index model for dynamic
discrete choices that extends conventional discrete-time duration analysis. They separate out dura-
tion dependence from heterogeneity in a semiparametric framework more general than conventional
discrete-time duration models. They produce a new class of reduced-form models for dynamic treat-
ment eﬀects by adjoining time-to-treatment outcomes to the duration model. This analysis builds
on Heckman (1981a,b,c).
Their models are based on a latent variable for choice at time s,
I(s) = Ψ(s,Z (s)) − η(s),
where the Z(s) are observables and η(s) are unobservables from the point of view of the econome-
trician. Treatments at diﬀerent times may have diﬀerent outcome consequences which they model
after analyzing the time to treatment equation. Deﬁne D(s) as an indicator of receipt of treatment
at date s. Treatment is taken the ﬁrst time I(s) becomes positive. Thus,
D(s) = 1[I(s) ≥ 0,I(s − 1) < 0,...,I(1) < 0],
where the indicator function 1[·] takes the value of 1 if the term inside the braces is true.53 They
derive conditions for identifying a model with general forms of duration dependence in the time to
treatment equation using a large sample from the distribution of (D,Z).
48See Chan and Hamilton (2006) for a structural dynamic empirical analysis of this problem.
49See Heckman and Smith (1998). Use of participation data to infer preferences about outcomes is developed in
Heckman (1974).
50See, e.g., Rust (1987), Manski (1993), Hotz and Miller (1993) and the papers cited in Rust (1994).
51See, e.g., Gill and Robins (2001) and Lechner and Miquel (2002).
52For estimates based on this idea, see Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003), Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil
(2005), Cunha and Heckman (2007, 2008); Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005, 2006), and Heckman and Navarro
(2005).
53This framework captures the essential feature of any stopping time model. For example, in a search model with
one wage oﬀer per period, I(s) is the gap between market wages and reservation wages at time s. See, e.g., Flinn
and Heckman (1982). This framework can also approximate the explicit dynamic discrete-choice model analyzed in
section 5.2.
345.1.1 Single-Spell Duration Model
Individuals are assumed to start spells in a given (exogenously determined) state and to exit the
state at the beginning of time period S.54 S is thus a random variable representing total completed
spell length. Let D(s) = 1 if the individual exits at time s, S = s, and D(s) = 0 otherwise. In an
analysis of drug treatments, S is the discrete-time period in the course of an illness at the beginning
of which the drug is administered. Let ¯ S (< ∞) be the upper limit on the time the agent being
studied can be at risk for a treatment. It is possible in this example that D(1) = 0,...,D(¯ S) = 0,
so that a patient never receives treatment. In a schooling example, “treatment” is not schooling,
but rather dropping out of schooling.55 In this case, ¯ S is an upper limit to the number of years of
schooling, and D(¯ S) = 1 if D(1) = 0,...,D(¯ S − 1) = 0.
The duration model can be speciﬁed recursively in terms of the threshold-crossing behavior of
the sequence of underlying latent indices I(s). Recall that I(s) = Ψ(s,Z (s)) − η(s), with Z(s)
being the regressors that are observed by the analyst. The Z(s) can include expectations of future
outcomes given current information in the case of models with forward-looking behavior. For a given
stopping time s, let Ds = (D(1),...,D(s)) and designate by d(s) and ds values that D(s) and Ds
assume. Thus, d(s) can be zero or one and ds is a sequence of s zeros or a sequence containing s−1
zeros and a single one. Denote a sequence of all zeros by (0), regardless of its length. Then,




1[I(s) ≥ 0] if Ds−1 = (0)
0 otherwise,
s = 2,..., ¯ S.
For s = 2,..., ¯ S, the indicator 1[I(s) ≥ 0] is observed if and only if the agent is still at risk of
treatment, Ds−1 = (0). To identify period s parameters from period s outcomes, one must condition





, and let η = (η(1),...,η(¯ S)). Assume that Z is statistically inde-
pendent of η. Heckman and Navarro (2007) assume that Ψ(s,Z(s)) = Z(s)γs. We deal with a




. We let Ψ denote the abstract parameter.
Depending on the values assumed by Ψ(s,Z(s)), one can generate very general forms of duration
dependence that depend on the values assumed by the Z(s). HN allow for period-speciﬁc eﬀects of
regressors on the latent indices generating choices.
This model is the reduced form of a general dynamic discrete-choice model. Like many reduced-
form models, the link to choice theory is not clearly speciﬁed. It is not a conventional multinomial
choice model in a static (perfect certainty) setting with associated outcomes.
54Thus we abstract from the initial-conditions problem discussed in Heckman (1981b).
55In the drug treatment example, S may designate the time a treatment regime is completed.
355.1.2 Identiﬁcation of Duration Models with General Error Structures and Duration
Dependence
Heckman and Navarro (2007) establish semiparametric identiﬁcation of the model of equation (11)
assuming access to a large sample of i.i.d. (D,Z) observations. Let Zs = (Z(1),...,Z(s)). Data
on (D,Z) directly identify the conditional probability Pr(D(s) = d(s)|Zs, Ds−1 = (0)) a.e.
FZs|Ds−1=(0) where FZs|Ds−1=(0) is the distribution of Zs conditional on previous choices Ds−1 = (0).
Assume that (Ψ,Fη) ∈ Φ × H, where Fη is the distribution of η and Φ × H is the parameter space.
The goal is to establish conditions under which knowledge of Pr(D(s) = d(s)|Z,Ds−1 = (0)) a.e.
FZ|Ds−1=(0) allows the analyst to identify a unique element of Φ × H. They use a limit strategy
that allows them to recover the parameters by conditioning on large values of the indices of the
preceding choices. This identiﬁcation strategy is widely used in the analysis of discrete choice.56
They establish suﬃcient conditions for the identiﬁcation of model (11). We prove the following
more general result:
Theorem 1. For the model deﬁned by equation (11), assume the following conditions:
(i) η ⊥ ⊥Z.
(ii) η is an absolutely continuous random variable on R
¯ S with support
Q¯ S
s=1(η(s),η(s)), where
−∞ ≤ η(s) < η(s) ≤ +∞, for all s = 1,..., ¯ S.
(iii) The Ψ(s,Z(s)) satisfy the Matzkin (1992) conditions for identiﬁcation of nonparametric binary









× Supp(Z(s)), s = 2,..., ¯ S.
(v) Supp(Ψ(Z)) ⊇ Supp(η).
Then Fη and Ψ(Z) are identiﬁed, where the Ψ(s,Z(s)), s = 1,..., ¯ S, are identiﬁed over the relevant
support admitted by (ii).
Proof. We sketch the proof for ¯ S = 2. The result for general ¯ S follows by a recursive application of
this argument. Consider the following three probabilities.
(a) Pr(D(1) = 1 | Z = z) =
R Ψ(1,z(1))
η(1) fη(1)(u)du










56See, e.g., Manski (1988), Heckman (1990), Heckman and Honor´ e (1989, 1990), Matzkin (1992, 1993), Taber (2000),
and Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003). A version of the strategy of this proof was ﬁrst used in psychology where
agent choice sets are eliminated by experimenter manipulation. The limit set argument eﬀectively uses regressors to
reduce the choice set confronting agents. See Falmagne (1985) for a discussion of models of choice in psychology.
57See Abbring and Heckman (2007, Appendix B.1) for a review of the conditions Matzkin (1992) imposes for
identiﬁcation of nonparametric binary choice models. See also Matzkin (1994).
36The left-hand sides are observed from data on those who stop in period 1 (a); those who stop in
period 2 (b); and those who terminate in the “0” state in period 2 (c). From Matzkin (1992), we can
identify Ψ(1,z(1)) and Fη(1) from (a). Using (b), we can ﬁx z(2) and vary Ψ(1,z(1)). From (iv) and
(v), there exists a limit set e Z1, possibly dependent on z(2), such that limz(1)→ e Z1 Ψ(1,z(1)) = η(1).
Thus we can construct




and identify Ψ(2,z(2)) and Fη(2). Using the Ψ(1,z(1)), Ψ(2,z(2)), one can trace out the joint
distribution Fη(1),η(2) over its support. Under the Matzkin conditions, identiﬁcation is achieved on
a non-negligible set. The proof generalizes in a straightforward way to general ¯ S.
Observe that if the η(s) are bounded by ﬁnite upper and lower limits, we can only determine
the Ψ(s,Z(s)) over the limits so deﬁned. Consider the ﬁrst step of the proof. Under the Matzkin
conditions, Fη(1) is known. From assumption (ii), we can determine
Ψ(1,z(1)) = F−1
η(1)(Pr(D(1) = 1 | Z = z)),
but only over the support (η(1), ¯ η(1)). If the support of η(1) is R, we determine Ψ(1,z(1)) for
all z(1). Heckman and Navarro (2007) analyze the special case Ψ(s,Z(s)) = Z(s)γs and invoke
sequential rank conditions to identify γs, even over limited supports. They also establish that the
limit sets are non-negligible in this case so that standard deﬁnitions of identiﬁability (see, e.g.,
Matzkin, 1992) will be satisﬁed.58 Construction of the limit set e Zs,s = 1,..., ¯ S, depends on the
functional form speciﬁed for the Ψ(s,Z(s)). For the linear-in-parameters case Ψ(s,Z(s)) = Z(s)γs,
they are obtained by letting arguments get big or small. Matzkin (1992) shows how to establish the
limit sets for functions in her family of functions.
A version of Theorem 1 with Ψ(s,Z(s)) = Z(s)γs that allows dependence between Z and ηs
except for one component can be proved using the analysis of Lewbel (2000) and Honor´ e and Lewbel
(2002).59
The assumptions of Theorem 1 will be satisﬁed if there are transition-speciﬁc exclusion restric-
tions for Z with the required properties. As noted in section 4, in models with many periods, this
may be a demanding requirement. Very often, the Z variables are time invariant and so cannot
be used as exclusion restrictions. Corollary 1 in HN, for the special case Ψ(s,Z(s)) = Z(s)γs, tells
us that the HN version of the model can be identiﬁed, even if there are no conventional exclusion
restrictions and the Z(s) are the same across all time periods, if suﬃcient structure is placed on how
the γs vary with s. Variations in the values of γs across time periods arise naturally in ﬁnite horizon
58Heckman and Navarro (2007) prove their theorem for a model where D(s) = 1[I(s) ≤ 0] if D
s−1 = (0),s = 2,..., ¯ S.
Our formulation of their result is consistent with the notation in this chapter.
59HN discuss a version of such an extension at their website. Lewbel’s conditions are very strong. To account for
general forms of dependence between Z and η
s requires modeling the exact form of the dependence. Nonparametric
solutions to this problem remain an open question in the literature on dynamic discrete choice. One solution is to
assume functional forms for the error terms, but in general, this is not enough to identify the model without further
restrictions imposed. See Heckman and Honor´ e (1990).
37dynamic discrete-choice models where a shrinking horizon produces diﬀerent eﬀects of the same
variable in diﬀerent periods. For example, in Wolpin’s (1987) analysis of a search model, the value
function depends on time and the derived decision rules weight the same invariant characteristics
diﬀerently in diﬀerent periods. In a schooling model, parental background and resources may aﬀect
education continuation decisions diﬀerently at diﬀerent stages of the schooling decision. The model
generating equation (11) can be semiparametrically identiﬁed without transition-speciﬁc exclusions
if the duration dependence is suﬃciently general. For a proof, see Corollary 1 in Heckman and
Navarro (2007).
The conditions of Theorem 1 are somewhat similar to the conditions on the regressor eﬀects
needed for identiﬁcation of the continuous-time event-history models in section 4. One diﬀerence is
that the present analysis requires independent variation of the regressor eﬀects over the support of
the distribution of the unobservables generating outcomes. The continuous-time analysis based on
the functional form of the mixed proportional hazard model (MPH) as analyzed by Abbring and
Van den Berg (2003a) only requires local independent variation.
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 in HN have important consequences. The Ψ(s,Z(s)), s = 1,..., ¯ S,
can be interpreted as duration dependence parameters that are modiﬁed by the Z(s) and that vary
across the spell in a more general way than is permitted in mixed proportional hazards (MPH),
generalized accelerated failure time (GAFT) models or standard discrete-time hazard models.60
Duration dependence in conventional speciﬁcations of duration models is usually generated by vari-
ation in model intercepts. The regressors are allowed to interact with the duration dependence
parameters. In the speciﬁcations justiﬁed by Theorem 1, the “heterogeneity” distribution Fη is
identiﬁed for a general model. No special “permanent-transitory” structure is required for the un-
observables although that speciﬁcation is traditional in duration analysis. Their explicit treatment
of the stochastic structure of the duration model is what allows HN to link in a general way the
unobservables generating the duration model to the unobservables generating the outcome equa-
tions that are introduced in the next section. Such an explicit link is not currently available in the
literature on continuous-time duration models for treatment eﬀects surveyed in section 4, and is
useful for modelling selection eﬀects in outcomes across diﬀerent treatment times. Their outcomes
can be both discrete and continuous and are not restricted to be durations.
Under the conditions given in Corollary 1 of HN, no period-speciﬁc exclusion conditions are
required on the Z. Hansen and Sargent (1980) and Abbring and Van den Berg (2003b) note that
period-speciﬁc exclusions are not natural in reduced-form duration models designed to approximate
forward-looking life cycle models. Agents make current decisions in light of their forecasts of future
constraints and opportunities, and if they forecast some components well, and they aﬀect current
decisions, then they are in Z (s) in period s. Corollary 1 in HN establishes identiﬁcation without
such exclusions. HN adjoin a system of counterfactual outcomes to their model of time to treatment
to produce a model for dynamic counterfactuals. We summarize that work next.
60See Ridder (1990) for a discussion of these models.
385.1.3 Reduced-Form Dynamic Treatment Eﬀects
This section reviews a reduced-form approach to generating dynamic counterfactuals developed by
HN. They apply and extend the analysis of Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) and Cunha,
Heckman, and Navarro (2005, 2006) to generate ex post potential outcomes and their relationship
with the time to treatment indices I(s) analyzed in the preceding subsection. With reduced-form
models, it is diﬃcult to impose restrictions from economic theory or to make distinctions between
ex ante and ex post outcomes. In the structural model developed below, these and other distinctions
can be made easily.
Associated with each treatment time s, s = 1,..., ¯ S, is a vector of ¯ T outcomes,
Y (s,X,U (s)) =
¡





Outcomes depend on covariates X and U (s) = (U (1,s),...,U (t,s),..., U(¯ T,s)) that are, respec-
tively, observable and unobservable by the econometrician. Elements of Y (s,X,U (s)) are outcomes
associated with stopping or receiving treatment at the beginning of period s. They are factual
outcomes if treatment s is actually selected (S = s and D(s) = 1). Outcomes corresponding to
treatments s0 that are not selected (D(s0) = 0) are counterfactuals. The outcomes associated with
each treatment may be diﬀerent, and indeed the treatments administered at diﬀerent times may be
diﬀerent.
The components Y (t,s,X,U(t,s)) of the vector Y (s,X,U (s)) can be interpreted as the out-
comes revealed at age t, t = 1,..., ¯ T, and may themselves be vectors. The reduced-form approach
presented in this section is not suﬃciently rich to capture the notion that agents revise their antic-
ipations of components of Y (s,X,U (s)), s = 1,..., ¯ S, as they acquire information over time. This
notion is systematically developed using the structural model discussed below in section 5.2.
The treatment “times” may be stages that are not necessarily connected with real times. Thus s
may be a schooling level. The correspondence between stages and times is exact if each stage takes
one period to complete. Our notation is more ﬂexible, and time and periods can be deﬁned more
generally. Our notation in this section accommodates both cases.
Henceforth, whenever we have random variables with multiple arguments R0(s,Q0,...) or
R1(t,s,Q0,...) where the argument list begins with treatment state s or both age t and state
s (perhaps followed by other arguments Q0,...), we will make use of several condensed nota-
tions: (a) dropping the ﬁrst argument as we collect the components into vectors R0(Q0,...) or
R1(s,Q0,...) of length ¯ S or ¯ T, respectively, and (b) going further in the case of R1, dropping the
s argument as we collect the vectors R1(s,Q0,...) into a single ¯ S × ¯ T array R1(Q0,...), but also
(c) suppressing one or more of the other arguments and writing R1(t,s) or R1(t,s,Q0) instead of
R1(t,s,Q0,Q1,...), etc. This notation is suﬃciently rich to represent the life cycle of outcomes for
persons who receive treatment at s. Thus, in a schooling example, the components of this vector
may include life cycle earnings, employment, and the like associated with a person with character-
istics X, U (s), s = 1,..., ¯ S, who completes s years of schooling and then forever ceases schooling.
It could include earnings while in treatment at some level for persons who will eventually attain
further schooling as well as post-school earnings.
39We measure age and treatment time on the same time scale, with origin 1, and let ¯ T ≥ ¯ S.
Then, the Y (t,s,X,U(t,s)) for t < s are outcomes realized while the person is in school at age t
(s is the time the person will leave school; t is the current age) and before “treatment” (stopping
schooling) has occurred. When t ≥ s, these are post-school outcomes for treatment with s years
of schooling. In this case, t − s is years of post-school experience. In the case of a drug trial, the
Y (t,s,X,U (t,s)) for t < s are measurements observed before the drug is taken at s and if t ≥ s,
they are the post-treatment measurements.
Following Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003), the variables in Y (t,s,X,U(t,s)) may include
discrete, continuous or mixed discrete-continuous components. For the discrete or mixed discrete-
continuous cases, HN assume that latent continuous variables cross thresholds to generate the
discrete components. Durations can be generated by latent index models associated with each
outcome crossing thresholds analogous to the model presented in equation (11). In this framework,
for example, we can model the eﬀect of attaining s years of schooling on durations of unemployment
or durations of employment.
The reduced-form analysis in this section does not impose restrictions on the temporal (age)
structure of outcomes across treatment times in constructing outcomes and specifying identifying
assumptions. Each treatment time can have its own age path of outcomes pre and post treatment.
Outcomes prior to treatment and outcomes after treatment are treated symmetrically and both may
be diﬀerent for diﬀerent treatment times. In particular, HN can allow earnings at age t for people
who receive treatment at some future time s0 to diﬀer from earnings at age t for people who receive
treatment at some future time s00, min(s0,s00) > t even after controlling for U and X.
This generality is in contrast with the analyses of Robins (1997) and Gill and Robins (2001)
discussed in section 3 and the analysis of Abbring and Van den Berg (2003b) discussed in section 4.
These analyses require exclusion of such anticipation eﬀects to secure identiﬁcation, because their
models attribute dependence of treatment on past outcomes to selection eﬀects. The sequential
randomization assumption (M-1) underlying the work of Gill and Robins allows treatment decisions
S(t) at time t to depend on past outcomes Y t−1
p0 in a general way. Therefore, without additional
restrictions, it is not possible to also identify causal (anticipatory) eﬀects of treatment S(t) on
Y t−1
p0 . The no-anticipation condition (NA) excludes such eﬀects and secures identiﬁcation in their
framework.61 It is essential for applying the conditional independence assumptions in deriving the
61The role of the no-anticipation assumption in Abbring and Van den Berg (2003b) is similar. However, their
main analysis assumes an asymmetric treatment-outcome setup in which treatment is not observed if it takes place
after the outcome transition. In that case, the treatment time is censored at the outcome time. In this asymmetric
setup, anticipatory eﬀects of treatment on outcomes cannot be identiﬁed because the econometrician cannot observe
variation of outcome transitions with future treatment times. This point may appear to be unrelated to the present
discussion, but it is not. As was pointed out by Abbring and Van den Berg (2003b), and in section 4, the asymmetric
Abbring and Van den Berg (2003b) model can be extended to a fully symmetric bivariate duration model in which
treatment hazards may be causally aﬀected by the past occurrence of an outcome event just like outcomes may be
aﬀected by past treatment events. This model could be used to analyze data in which both treatment and outcome
times are fully observed. In this symmetric setup, any dependence in the data of the time-to-treatment hazard on past
outcome events is interpreted as an eﬀect of outcomes on future treatment decisions, and not an anticipatory eﬀect
of treatment on past outcomes. If one does not restrict the eﬀects of outcomes on future treatment, without further
40g-computation formula.
HN’s very diﬀerent approach to identiﬁcation allows them to incorporate anticipation eﬀects. As
in their analysis of the duration model, they assume that there is an exogenous source of independent
variation of treatment decisions, independent of past outcomes. Any variation in current outcomes
with variation in future treatment decisions induced by this exogenous source cannot be due to
selection eﬀects (since they explicitly control for the unobservables) and is interpreted as anticipatory
eﬀects of treatment in their framework. However, their structural analysis naturally excludes such
eﬀects (see section 5.2 below). Therefore, a natural interpretation of the ability of HN to identify
anticipatory eﬀects is that they have overidentifying restrictions that allow them to test their model
and, if necessary, relax their assumptions.
In a model with uncertainty, agents act on and value ex ante outcomes. The model developed
below in section 5.2 distinguishes ex ante from ex post outcomes. The model developed in this
section cannot because, within it, it is diﬃcult to specify the information sets on which agents act
or the mechanism by which agents forecast and act on Y (s,X,U (s)) when they are making choices.
One justiﬁcation for not making an ex ante – ex post distinction is that the agents being
modeled operate under perfect foresight even though econometricians do not observe all of the
information available to the agents. In this framework, the U (s),s = 1,..., ¯ S, are an ingredient of
the econometric model that accounts for the asymmetry of information between the agent and the
econometrician studying the agent.
Without imposing assumptions about the functional structure of the outcome equations, it is
not possible to nonparametrically identify counterfactual outcome states Y (s,X,U (s)) that have
never been observed. Thus, in a schooling example, HN assume that analysts observe life cycle
outcomes for some persons for each stopping time (level of ﬁnal grade completion) and our notation
reﬂects this.62 However, analysts do not observe Y (s,X,U (s)) for all s for anyone. A person can
have only one stopping time (one completed schooling level). This observational limitation creates
our evaluation problem, the “fundamental problem of causal inference”.63
In addition to this problem, there is the standard selection problem that the Y (s,X,U (s))
are only observed for persons who stop at s and not for a random sample of the population. The
selected distribution may not accurately characterize the population distribution of Y (s,X,U (s))
for persons selected at random. Note also that without further structure, we can only identify
treatment responses within a given policy environment. In another policy environment, where the
rules governing selection into treatment and/or the outcomes from treatment may be diﬀerent, the
same time to treatment may be associated with entirely diﬀerent responses.64 We now turn to the
HN analysis of identiﬁcation of outcome and treatment time distributions.
restrictions, the data on treatments occurring after the outcome event carry no information on anticipatory eﬀects of
treatment on outcomes and they face an identiﬁcation problem similar to that in the asymmetric case.
62In practice, analysts can only observe a portion of the life cycle after treatment. See the discussion on pooling
data across samples in Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005) to replace missing life cycle data.
63See Holland (1986) or Gill and Robins (2001).
64This is the problem of general equilibrium eﬀects, and leads to violation of the policy invariance conditions. See
Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998), Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) or Abbring and Van den Berg (2003b)
for discussion of this problem.
415.1.4 Identiﬁcation of Outcome and Treatment Time Distributions
We assume access to a large i.i.d. sample from the distribution of (S,Y (S,X,U (S)),X,Z), where S
is the stopping time, X are the variables determining outcomes and Z are the variables determining
choices. We also know Pr(S = s | Z = z), for s = 1,..., ¯ S, from the data. For expositional
convenience, we ﬁrst consider the case of scalar outcomes Y (S,X,U (S)). An analysis for vector
Y (S,X,U (S)) is presented in HN and is discussed below.
Consider the analysis of continuous outcomes. HN analyze more general cases. Their results
extend the analyses of Heckman and Honor´ e (1990), Heckman (1990) and Carneiro, Hansen, and
Heckman (2003) by considering choices generated by a stopping time model. To simplify the notation
in this section, assume that the scalar outcome associated with stopping at time s can be written
as Y (s) = µ(s,X) + U (s), where Y (s) is shorthand for Y (s,X,U (s)). Y (s) is observed only
if D(s) = 1 where the D(s) are generated by the model analyzed in Theorem 1. Write I(s) =
Ψ(s,Z(s)) − η(s). Assume that the Ψ(s,Z(s)) belong to the Matzkin (1992) class of functions.
We use the condensed representations I, Ψ(Z), η, Y , µ(X) and U as described in the previous
subsection.
Heckman and Navarro permit general stochastic dependence within the components of U, within
the components of η and across the two vectors. They assume that (X,Z) are independent of (U,η).
Each component of (U,η) has a zero mean. The joint distribution of (U,η) is assumed to be absolutely
continuous.
With “suﬃcient variation” in the components of Ψ(Z), one can identify µ(s,X), [Ψ(1,Z (1)),...,
Ψ(s,Z (s))] and the joint distribution of U(s) and ηs. This enables the analyst to identify average
treatment eﬀects across all stopping times, since one can extract E(Y (s) − Y (s0) | X = x) from
the marginal distributions of Y (s), s = 1,..., ¯ S.
Theorem 2. Write Ψs(Z) = (Ψ(1,Z(1),...,Ψ(s,Z(s))). Assume in addition to the conditions in
Theorem 1 that
(i) E[U(s)] = 0. (U(s),ηs) are continuous random variables with support Supp(U(s))×Supp(ηs)
with upper and lower limits (U(s),ηs) and (U(s),ηs), respectively, s = 1,..., ¯ S. These condi-
tions hold for each component of each subvector. The joint system is thus variation free for
each component with respect to every other component.
(ii) (U(s),ηs)⊥ ⊥(X,Z), s = 1,..., ¯ S (independence).
(iii) µ(s,X) is a continuous function, s = 1,..., ¯ S.
(iv) Supp(Ψ(Z),X) = Supp(Ψ(Z)) × Supp(X).
Then one can identify µ(s,X), Ψs(Z), Fηs,U(s), s = 1,..., ¯ S, where Ψ(Z) is identiﬁed over the
support admitted by condition (ii) of Theorem 1.
Proof. See Abbring and Heckman (2007), Appendix C.
42The proof in Abbring and Heckman (2007, Appendix C) covers the case of vector Y (s,X,U(s))
where each component is a continuous random variable. Appendix D of Abbring and Heckman (2007)
states and proves a more general theorem for age-speciﬁc outcomes Y (t,s,X,U(t,s)), t = 1,..., ¯ T,
where Y can be a vector of continuous and discrete outcomes. In particular, HN can identify age-
speciﬁc earnings ﬂows associated with multiple sources of income.




only one of these outcomes for any person. Observe that exclusion restrictions in the arguments of
the choice of treatment equation are not required to identify the counterfactuals. What is required
is independent variation of arguments which might be achieved by exclusion conditions but can be
obtained by other functional restrictions (see HN, Corollary 1, for example). One can identify the
µ(s,X) (up to constants) without the limit set argument. Thus, one can identify certain features
of the model without using the limit set argument. See HN.
As a by-product of Theorem 2, one can construct various counterfactual distributions of Y (s)
for agents with index crossing histories such that D(s) = 0 (that is, for whom Y (s) is not observed).
Deﬁne B(s) = 1[I(s) ≥ 0], Bs = (B(1),...,B(s)), and let bs denote a vector of possible values of
Bs. D(s) was deﬁned as B(s) if Bs−1 = (0) and 0 otherwise. Theorem 2 gives conditions under
which the counterfactual distribution of Y (s) for those with D(s0) = 1, s0 6= s, can be constructed.
More generally, it can be used to construct
Pr
³
Y (s) ≤ y (s) | Bs0
= bs0
,X = x,Z = z
´
for all of the 2s0
possible sequences bs0
of Bs0
outcomes up to s0 ≤ s. If bs0
equals a sequence of s0−1
zeros followed by a one, then Bs0
= bs0
corresponds to D(s0) = 1. The event Bs0
= (0) corresponds
to Ds0
= (0), i.e., S > s0. For all other sequences bs0
, Bs0
= bs0
deﬁnes a subpopulation of the
agents with D(s00) = 1 for some s00 < s0 and multiple index crossings. For example, Bs0
= (0,1,0)
corresponds to D(2) = 1 and I(3) < 0. This deﬁnes a subpopulation that takes treatment at time
2, but that would not take treatment at time 3 if it would not have taken treatment at time 2.65 It
is tempting to interpret such sequences with multiple crossings as corresponding to multiple entry
into and exit from treatment. However, this is inconsistent with the stopping time model (11), and
would require extension of the model to deal with recurrent treatment. Whether a threshold-crossing
model corresponds to a structural model of treatment choice is yet another issue, which is taken up
in the next section and is also addressed in Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2007).
The counterfactuals that are identiﬁed by ﬁxing D(s0) = 1 for diﬀerent treatment times s0 in the
general model of HN have an asymmetric aspect. HN can generate Y (s) distributions for persons
who are treated at s or before. Without further structure, they cannot generate the distributions
of these random variables for people who receive treatment at times after s.
The source of this asymmetry is the generality of duration model (11). At each stopping time s,
HN acquire a new random variable η(s) which can have arbitrary dependence with Y (s) and Y (s0)
for all s and s0. From Theorem 2, HN can identify the dependence between η(s0) and Y (s) if s0 ≤ s.
They cannot identify the dependence between η(s0) and Y (s) for s0 > s without imposing further
65Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2007) develop an ordered choice model with stochastic thresholds.
43structure on the unobservables.66. Thus, one can identify the distribution of college outcomes for
high school graduates who do not go on to college and can compare these to outcomes for high school
graduates, so they can identify the parameter “treatment on the untreated.” However, one cannot
identify the distribution of high school outcomes for college graduates (and hence treatment on
the treated parameters) without imposing further structure.67 Since one can identify the marginal
distributions under the conditions of Theorem 2, one can identify pairwise average treatment eﬀects
for all s,s0.
It is interesting to contrast the model identiﬁed by Theorem 2 with a conventional static multi-
nomial discrete-choice model with an associated system of counterfactuals, as presented in Heckman
and Vytlacil (2007a, Appendix B) and analyzed in Abbring and Heckman (2007, section 2). Using
standard tools, it is possible to establish semiparametric identiﬁcation of the conventional static
model of discrete choice joined with counterfactuals and to identify all of the standard mean coun-
terfactuals. For that model there is a ﬁxed set of unobservables governing all choices of states. Thus
the analyst does not acquire new unobservables associated with each stopping time as occurs in a
dynamic model. In a dynamic model, selection eﬀects for Y (s) depend on the unobservables up to s
but not later innovations Selection eﬀects in a static discrete-choice model depend on a ﬁxed set of
unobservables for all outcomes. With suitable normalizations, HN identify the joint distributions of
choices and associated outcomes without the diﬃculties, just noted, that appear in the reduced-form
dynamic model. HN develop models for discrete outcomes including duration models.
5.1.5 Using Factor Models to Identify Joint Distributions of Counterfactuals
From Theorem 2 and its generalizations reported in HN, one can identify joint distributions of
outcomes for each treatment time s and the index generating treatment times. One cannot identify
the joint distributions of outcomes across treatment times. Moreover, as just discussed, one cannot,
in general, identify treatment on the treated parameters.
Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005) and Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) show how
to use factor models to identify the joint distributions across treatment times and recover the
standard treatment parameters. HN use their approach to identify the joint distribution of Y =
(Y (1),...,Y (¯ S)).
The basic idea underlying this approach is to use joint distributions for outcomes measured at
each treatment time s along with the choice index to construct the joint distribution of outcomes
across treatment choices. To illustrate how to implement this intuition, suppose that we augment
Theorem 2 by appealing to Theorem 2 in Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) to identify the
joint distribution of the vector of outcomes at each stopping time along with Is = (I (1),...,I (s))
66One possible structure is a factor model which is applied to this problem in the next section.
67In the schooling example, one can identify treatment on the treated for the ﬁnal category ¯ S since D




= 1. Thus at stage ¯ S − 1, one can identify the distribution of Y
 ¯ S − 1

for persons for whom D (0) =
0,...,D





= 1. Hence, if college is the terminal state, and high school the state preceding college,
one can identify the distribution of high school outcomes for college graduates.
44for each s. For each s, we may write
Y (t,s,X,U (t,s)) = µ(t,s,X) + U (t,s), t = 1,..., ¯ T
I(s) = Ψ(s,Z(s)) − η(s).
The scale of Ψ(s,Z(s)) is determined from the Matzkin (1992) conditions. If we specify the Matzkin
functions only up to scale, we determine the functions up to scale and make a normalization. From
Theorem 2, we can identify the joint distribution of (η(1),...,η(s), U(1,s),...,U(¯ T,s)).
To review these concepts and their application to the model discussed in this section, suppose
that we adopt a one-factor model where θ is the factor. It has mean zero. The errors can be
represented by
η(s) = ϕsθ + εη(s)
U (t,s) = αt,sθ + εt,s, t = 1,..., ¯ T, s = 1,..., ¯ S.
The θ are independent of all of the εη(s), εt,s and the ε’s are mutually independent mean zero
disturbances. The ϕs and αt,s are factor loadings. Since θ is an unobservable, its scale is unknown.
One can set the scale of θ by normalizing one factor loading, say α ¯ T,¯ S = 1. From the joint distribution
of (ηs,U (s)), one can identify σ2
θ, αt,s,ϕs,t = 1,..., ¯ T, for s = 1,..., ¯ S, using the arguments
presented in, e.g., Abbring and Heckman (2007, section 2.8). A suﬃcient condition is ¯ T ≥ 3, but
this ignores possible additional information from cross-system restrictions. From this information,








even though the analyst does not observe outcomes for the same person at two diﬀerent stopping




joint distribution, one can recover the standard mean treatment eﬀects as well as the joint distribu-
tions of the potential outcomes. One can determine the percentage of participants at treatment time
s who beneﬁt from participation compared to what their outcomes would be at other treatment
times. One can perform a parallel analysis for models for discrete outcomes and durations. The
analysis can be generalized to multiple factors. Conventional factor analysis assumes that the unob-
servables are normally distributed. Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) establish nonparametric
identiﬁability of the θ’s and the ε’s and their analysis of nonparametric identiﬁability applies here.
Theorem 2, strictly applied, actually produces only one scalar outcome along with one or more
choices for each stopping time.68 If vector outcomes are not available, access to a measurement
system M that assumes the same values for each stopping time can substitute for the need for
vector outcomes for Y . Let Mj be the jth component of this measurement system. Write
Mj = µj,M(X) + Uj,M, j = 1,...,J,
where Uj,M are mean zero and independent of X.
68HN and Abbring and Heckman (2007) analyze the vector-outcome case.
45Suppose that the Uj,M have a one-factor structure so Uj,M = αj,Mθ + εj,M, j = 1,...,J, where
the εj,M are mean zero, mutually independent random variables, independent of the θ. Adjoining
these measurements to the one outcome measure Y (s) can substitute for the measurements of Y (t,s)
used in the previous example. In an analysis of schooling, the Mj can be test scores that depend on
ability θ. Ability is assumed to aﬀect outcomes Y (s) and the choice of treatment times indices.
The factor models implement a matching on unobservables assumption, {Y (s)}
¯ S
s=1 ⊥ ⊥ S | X,Z,θ.
HN allow for the θ to be unobserved variables and present conditions under which their distributions
can be identiﬁed.
5.1.6 Summary of the Reduced-Form Model
A limitation of the reduced-form approach pursued in this section is that, because the underlying
model of choice is not clearly speciﬁed, it is not possible without further structure to form, or
even deﬁne, the marginal treatment eﬀect analyzed in Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001, 2005,
2007a,b) or Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006). The absence of well deﬁned choice equations is
problematic for the models analyzed thus far in this section of our chapter, although it is typical
of many statistical treatment eﬀect analyses.69 In this framework, it is not possible to distinguish
objective outcomes from subjective evaluations of outcomes, and to distinguish ex ante from ex
post outcomes. Another limitation of this analysis is its strong reliance on large support conditions
on the regressors coupled with independence assumptions. Independence can be relaxed following
Lewbel (2000) and Honor´ e and Lewbel (2002). The large support assumption plays a fundamental
role here and throughout the entire evaluation literature.
HN develop an explicit economic model for dynamic treatment eﬀects that allows analysts to
make these and other distinctions. They extend the analysis presented in this subsection to a
more precisely formulated economic model. They explicitly allow for agent updating of information
sets. A well posed economic model enables economists to evaluate policies in one environment and
accurately project them to new environments as well as to accurately forecast new policies never
previously experienced. We now turn to an analysis of a more fully articulated structural econometric
model.
5.2 A Sequential Structural Model with Option Values
This section analyzes the identiﬁability of a structural sequential optimal stopping time model. HN
use ingredients assembled in the previous sections to build an economically interpretable framework
for analyzing dynamic treatment eﬀects. For speciﬁcity, HN focus on a schooling model with associ-
ated earnings outcomes that is motivated by the research of Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Eckstein
and Wolpin (1999). They explicitly model costs and build a dynamic version of a Roy model. We
brieﬂy survey the literature on dynamic discrete choice in section 5.5 below.
In the model of this section, it is possible to interpret the literature on dynamic treatment eﬀects
69Heckman (2005) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a,b) point out that one distinctive feature of the economic
approach to program evaluation is the use of choice theory to deﬁne parameters and evaluate alternative estimators.
46within the context of an economic model; to allow for earnings while in school as well as grade-
speciﬁc tuition costs; to separately identify returns and costs; to distinguish private evaluations
from “objective” ex ante and ex post outcomes and to identify persons at various margins of choice.
In the context of medical economics, HN consider how to identify the pain and suﬀering associated
with a treatment as well as the distribution of beneﬁts from the intervention. They also model how
anticipations about potential future outcomes associated with various choices evolve over the life
cycle as sequential treatment choices are made.
In contrast to the analysis of section 5.1, the identiﬁcation proof for their dynamic choice model
works in reverse starting from the last period and sequentially proceeding backward. This approach
is required by the forward-looking nature of dynamic choice analysis and makes an interesting
contrast with the analysis of identiﬁcation for the reduced-form models which proceeds forward
from initial period values.
HN use limit set arguments to identify the parameters of outcome and measurement systems
for each stopping time s = 1,..., ¯ S, including means and joint distributions of unobservables.
These systems are identiﬁed without invoking any special assumptions about the structure of model
unobservables. When they invoke factor structure assumptions for the unobservables, they identify
the factor loadings associated with the measurements (as deﬁned in section 5.1.5) and outcomes.
They also nonparametrically identify the distributions of the factors and the distributions of the
innovations to the factors. With the joint distributions of outcomes and measurements in hand for
each treatment time, HN can identify cost (and preference) information from choice equations that
depend on outcomes and costs (preferences). HN can also identify joint distributions of outcomes
across stopping times. Thus, they can identify the proportion of people who beneﬁt from treatment.
Their analysis generalizes the one shot decision models of Cunha and Heckman (2007, 2008); Cunha,
Heckman, and Navarro (2005, 2006) to a sequential setting.
All agents start with one year of schooling at age 1 and then sequentially choose, at each
subsequent age, whether to continue for another year in school. New information arrives at each
age. One of the beneﬁts of staying in school is the arrival of new information about returns. Each
year of schooling takes one year of age to complete. There is no grade repetition. Once persons leave
school, they never return.70 As a consequence, an agent’s schooling level equals her age up to the
time S ≤ ¯ S she leaves school. After that, ageing continues up to age ¯ T ≥ ¯ S, but schooling does not.
We again denote D(s) = 1(S = s) for all s ∈ {1,..., ¯ S}. Let δ(t) = 1 if a person has left school at
or before age t; δ(t) = 0 if a person is still in school.
A person’s earnings at age t depend on her current schooling level s, and whether she has left
school on or before age t (δ(t) = 1) or not (δ(t) = 0). Thus,
Y (t,s,δ(t),X) = µ(t,s,δ(t),X) + U (t,s,δ(t)). (12)
Note that Y (t,s,0,X) is only meaningfully deﬁned if s = t, in which case it denotes the earnings of
a person as a student at age and schooling level s. More precisely, Y (s,s,0,X) denotes the earnings
70It would be better to derive such stopping behavior as a feature of a more general model with possible recurrence
of states. Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2007) develop general conditions under which it is optimal to stop and
never return.
47of an individual with characteristics X who is still enrolled in school at age and schooling level s and
goes on to complete at least s+1 years of schooling. The fact that earnings in school depend only on
the current schooling level, and not on the ﬁnal schooling level obtained, reﬂects the no-anticipation
condition (NA). U (t,s,δ(t)) is a mean zero shock that is unobserved by the econometrician but
may, or may not, be observed by the agent. Y (t,s,1,X) is meaningfully deﬁned only if s ≤ t, in
which case it denotes the earnings at age t of an agent who has decided to stop schooling at s.
The direct cost of remaining enrolled in school at age and schooling level s is
C (s,X,Z (s)) = Φ(s,X,Z (s)) + W (s)
where X and Z (s) are vectors of observed characteristics (from the point of view of the econome-
trician) that aﬀect costs at schooling level s, and W(s) are mean zero shocks that are unobserved
by the econometrician that may or may not be observed by the agent. Costs are paid in the period
before schooling is undertaken. The agent is assumed to know the costs of making schooling deci-
sions at each transition. The agent is also assumed to know the X and Z = (Z(1),...,Z(¯ S − 1))
from age 1.71
The optimal schooling decision involves comparisons of the value of continuing in school for
another year and the value of leaving school forever at each age and schooling level s ∈ {1,..., ¯ S−1}.
We can solve for these values, and the optimal schooling decision, by backward recursion.
The agent’s expected reward of stopping schooling forever at level and age s (i.e., receiving

















where Is are the state variables generating the age-s-speciﬁc information set Is.72 They include the
schooling level attained at age s, the covariates X and Z, as well as all other variables known to
the agent and used in forecasting future variables. Assume a ﬁxed, nonstochastic, interest rate r.73
The continuation value at age and schooling level s given information Is is denoted by K (s,Is).
At ¯ S −1, when an individual decides whether to stop or continue on to ¯ S, the expected reward
from remaining enrolled and continuing to ¯ S (i.e., the continuation value) is the earnings while in
school less costs plus the expected discounted future return that arises from completing ¯ S years of
schooling:
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71These assumptions can be relaxed and are made for convenience. See Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003),
Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005) and Cunha and Heckman (2007) for a discussion of selecting variables in the
agent’s information set.
72We only consider the agent’s information set here, and drop the subscript A for notational convenience.
73This assumption is relaxed in HN who present conditions under which r can be identiﬁed.
48where C
¡¯ S − 1,X,Z
¡¯ S − 1
¢¢
is the direct cost of schooling for the transition to ¯ S. This expression
embodies the assumption that each year of school takes one year of age. I¯ S−1 incorporates all of the
information known to the agent.
The value of being in school just before deciding on continuation at age and schooling level ¯ S−1
is the larger of the two expected rewards that arise from stopping at ¯ S − 1 or continuing one more
period to ¯ S:
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More generally, at age and schooling level s this value is



















Following the exposition of the reduced-form decision rule in section 5.1, deﬁne the decision rule
in terms of a ﬁrst passage of the “index” R(s,Is) − K(s,Is),
D(s) = 1[R(s,Is) − K(s,Is) ≥ 0, R(s − 1,Is−1) − K(s − 1,Is−1) < 0,...,R(1,I1) − K(1,I1) < 0].
An individual stops at the schooling level at the ﬁrst age where this index becomes positive. From
data on stopping times, one can nonparametrically identify the conditional probability of stopping
at s,




R(s,Is) − K(s,Is) ≥ 0,
R(s − 1,Is−1) − K(s − 1,Is−1) < 0,...,









HN use factor structure models based on the θ introduced in section 5.1 to deﬁne the information
updating structure. Agents learn about diﬀerent components of θ as they evolve through life. The
HN assumptions allow for the possibility that agents may know some or all the elements of θ at a
given age t regardless of whether or not they determine earnings at or before age t. Once known,
74This model allows no recall and is clearly a simpliﬁcation of a more general model of schooling with option values.
Instead of imposing the requirement that once a student drops out the student never returns, it would be useful to
derive this property as a feature of the economic environment and the characteristics of individuals. Cunha, Heckman,
and Navarro (2007) develop such conditions. In a more general model, diﬀerent persons could drop out and return
to school at diﬀerent times as information sets are revised. This would create further option value beyond the option
value developed in the text that arises from the possibility that persons who attain a given schooling level can attend
the next schooling level in any future period. Implicit in this analysis of option values is the additional assumption
that persons must work at the highest level of education for which they are trained. An alternative model allows
individuals to work each period at the highest wage across all levels of schooling that they have attained. Such a
model may be too extreme because it ignores the costs of switching jobs, especially at the higher educational levels
where there may be a lot of job-speciﬁc human capital for each schooling level. A model with these additional features
is presented in Heckman, Urzua, and Yates (2007).
49they are not forgotten. As agents accumulate information, they revise their forecasts of their future
earnings prospects at subsequent stages of the decision process. This aﬀects their decision rules and
subsequent choices. Thus HN allow for learning which can aﬀect both pretreatment outcomes and
posttreatment outcomes.75,76 All dynamic discrete-choice models make some assumptions about the
updating of information and any rigorous identiﬁcation analysis of this class of models must test
among competing speciﬁcations of information updating.
Variables unknown to the agent are integrated out by the agent in forming expectations over
future outcomes. Variables known to the agent are treated as constants by the agents. They are
integrated out by the econometrician to control for heterogeneity. These are separate operations
except for special cases. In general, the econometrician knows less than what the agent knows. The
econometrician seeks to identify the distributions of the variables in the agent information sets that
are used by the agents to form their expectations as well as the distributions of variables known
to the agent and treated as certain quantities by the agent but not known by the econometrician.
Determining which elements belong in the agent’s information set can be done using the methods
exposited in Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005) and Cunha and Heckman (2007) who consider
testing what components of X,Z,ε as well as θ are in the agent’s information set. We brieﬂy discuss
this issue at the end of the next section.77 HN establish semiparametric identiﬁcation of the model
assuming a given information structure. Determining the appropriate information structure facing
the agent and its evolution is an essential aspect of identifying any dynamic discrete-choice model.
Observe that agents with the same information variables It at age t have the same expectations
of future returns, and the same continuation and stopping values. They make the same investment
choices. Persons with the same ex ante reward, state and preference variables have the same ex ante
distributions of stopping times. Ex post, stopping times may diﬀer among agents with identical ex
ante information. Controlling for It, future realizations of stopping times do not aﬀect past rewards.
This rules out the problem that the future can cause the past, which may happen in HN’s reduced-
form model. It enforces the (NA) condition of Abbring and Van den Berg. Failure to accurately
model It produces failure of (NA).
HN establish semiparametric identiﬁcation of their model without period-by-period exclusion
restrictions. Their analysis extends Theorems 1 and 2 to an explicit choice-theoretic setting. They
use limit set arguments to identify the joint distributions of earnings (for each treatment time
75This type of learning about unobservables can be captured by HN’s reduced-form model, but not by Abbring and
Van den Berg’s (2003b) single-spell mixed proportional hazards model. Their model does not allow for time-varying
unobservables. Abbring and Van den Berg develop a multiple-spell model that allows for time-varying unobservables.
Moreover, their nonparametric discussion of (NA) and randomization does not exclude the sequential revelation to
the agent of a ﬁnite number of unobserved factors although they do not systematically develop such a model.
76It is fruitful to distinguish models with exogenous arrival of information (so that information arrives at each age t
independent of any actions taken by the agent) from information that arrives as a result of choices by the agent. The
HN model is in the ﬁrst class. The models of Miller (1984) or Pakes (1986) are in the second class. See our discussion
in section 5.5.
77The HN model of learning is clearly very barebones. Information arrives exogenously across ages. In the factor
model, all agents who advance to a stage get information about additional factors at that stage of their life cycles but
the realizations of the factors may diﬀer across persons.
50s across t) and any associated measurements that do not depend on the stopping time chosen.
For each stopping time, they construct the means of earnings outcomes at each age and of the
measurements and the joint distributions of the unobservables for earnings and measurements.
Factor analyzing the joint distributions of the unobservables, under conditions speciﬁed in Carneiro,
Hansen, and Heckman (2003), they identify the factor loadings, and nonparametrically identify the
distributions of the factors and the independent components of the error terms in the earnings and
measurement equations. Armed with this knowledge, they use choice data to identify the distribution
of the components of the cost functions that are not directly observed. They construct the joint
distributions of outcomes across stopping times. They also present conditions under which the
interest rate r is identiﬁed.
In their model, analysts can distinguish period by period ex ante expected returns from ex post
realizations by applying the analysis of Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005). See the survey in
Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006) and section 2 of Abbring and Heckman (2007) for discussions
of this approach. Because they link choices to outcomes through the factor structure assumption,
they can also distinguish ex ante preference or cost parameters from their ex post realizations. Ex
ante, agents may not know some components of θ. Ex post, they do. All of the information about
future rewards and returns is embodied in the information set It. Unless the time of treatment is
known with perfect certainty, it cannot cause outcomes prior to its realization.
The analysis of HN is predicated on speciﬁcation of agent information sets. These information
sets should be carefully distinguished from those of the econometrician. Cunha, Heckman, and
Navarro (2005) present methods for determining which components of future outcomes are in the
information sets of agents at each age, It. If there are components unknown to the agent at age t,
under rational expectations, agents form their value functions used to make schooling choices by
integrating out the unknown components using the distributions of the variables in their informa-
tion sets. Components that are known to the agent are treated as constants by the individual in
forming the value function but as unknown variables by the econometrician and their distribution is
estimated. The true information set of the agent is determined from the set of possible speciﬁcations
of the information sets of agents by picking the speciﬁcation that best ﬁts the data on choices and
outcomes penalizing for parameter estimation. If neither the agent nor the econometrician knows
a variable, the econometrician identiﬁes the determinants of the distribution of the unknown vari-
ables that is used by the agent to form expectations. If the agent knows some variables, but the
econometrician does not, the econometrician seeks to identify the distribution of the variables, but
the agent treats the variables as known constants.
HN can identify all of the treatment parameters including the pairwise average treatment ef-
fect (ATE), the marginal treatment eﬀect (MTE) for each transition (obtained by ﬁnding mean
outcomes for individuals indiﬀerent between transitions), all of the treatment on the treated and
treatment on the untreated parameters and the population distribution of treatment eﬀects by ap-
plying the analysis of Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro
(2005) to this model. Their analysis can be generalized to cover the case where there are vectors of
51contemporaneous outcome measures for diﬀerent stopping times. See HN for proofs and details.78
5.3 Identiﬁcation at Inﬁnity
Heckman and Navarro (2007), and many other researchers, rely on identiﬁcation at inﬁnity to
obtain their main identiﬁcation results. Identiﬁcation at inﬁnity is required to identify the average
treatment eﬀect (ATE) using IV and control function methods and in the reduced-form discrete-
time models developed in the previous subsections. While this approach is controversial, it is also
testable. In any sample, one can plot the distributions of the probability of each state (exit time) to
determine if the identiﬁcation conditions are satisﬁed in any sample. Figure 1, presented by HN from
the research of Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006), shows such plots for a six-state static schooling
model that they estimate. To identify the marginal outcome distributions for each state, the support
of the state probabilities should be the full unit interval. The identiﬁcation at inﬁnity condition
is clearly not satisﬁed in their data.79 Only the empirical distribution of the state probability
of graduating from a four-year college comes even close to covering the full unit interval. Thus,
their empirical results rely on parametric assumptions, and ATE and the marginal distributions of
outcomes are nonparametrically nonidentiﬁed in their data without invoking additional structure.
5.4 Comparing Reduced-Form and Structural Models
The reduced-form model analyzed in section 5.1 is typical of many reduced-form statistical ap-
proaches within which it is diﬃcult to make important conceptual distinctions. Because agent choice
equations are not modeled explicitly, it is hard to use such frameworks to formally analyze the de-
cision makers’ expectations, costs of treatment, the arrival of information, the content of agent
information sets and the consequences of the arrival of information for decisions regarding time to
treatment as well as outcomes. Key behavioral assumptions are buried in statistical assumptions. It
is diﬃcult to distinguish ex post from ex ante valuations of outcomes in the reduced-form models.
Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005), Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) and Cunha and
Heckman (2007, 2008) present analyses that distinguish ex ante anticipations from ex post realiza-
tions.80 In reduced-form models, it is diﬃcult to make the distinction between private evaluations
and preferences (e.g., “costs” as deﬁned in this section) from objective outcomes (the Y variables).
Statistical and reduced-form econometric approaches to analyzing dynamic counterfactuals ap-
peal to uncertainty to motivate the stochastic structure of models. They do not explicitly charac-
terize how agents respond to uncertainty or make treatment choices based on the arrival of new
information (see Robins, 1989, 1997, Lok, 2007, Gill and Robins, 2001, Abbring and Van den Berg,
2003b, and Van der Laan and Robins, 2003). The structural approach surveyed in section 5.2 and
developed by HN allows for a clear treatment of the arrival of information, agent expectations,
78The same limitations regarding independence assumptions between the regressors and errors discussed in the
analysis of reduced forms apply to the structural model.
79One can always argue that they are satisﬁed in an inﬁnite sample that has not yet been realized. That statement
has no empirical content.
80See the summary of this literature in Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006).
52and the eﬀects of new information on choice and its consequences. In an environment of imperfect
certainty about the future, it rules out the possibility of the future causing the past once the eﬀects
of agent information are controlled for.
The structural model developed by HN allows agents to learn about new factors (components
of θ) as they proceed sequentially through their life cycles. It also allows agents to learn about
other components of the model (see Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro, 2005). Agent anticipations of
when they will stop and the consequences of alternative stopping times can be sequentially revised.
Agent anticipated payoﬀs and stopping times are sequentially revised as new information becomes
available. The mechanism by which agents revise their anticipations is modeled and identiﬁed. See
Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005, 2006), Cunha and Heckman (2007, 2008) and Abbring and
Heckman (2007) for further discussion of these issues and Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006) for
a partial survey of recent developments in the literature.
The clearest interpretation of the models in the statistical literature on dynamic treatment
eﬀects is as ex post selection-corrected analyses of distributions of events that have occurred. In
a model of perfect certainty, where ex post and ex ante choices and outcomes are identical, the
reduced-form approach can be interpreted as approximating clearly speciﬁed choice models. In a
more general analysis with information arrival and agent updating of information sets, the nature
of the approximation is less clear cut. Thus, the current reduced-form literature is unclear as to
which agent decision-making processes and information arrival assumptions justify the conditional
sequential randomization assumptions widely used in the dynamic treatment eﬀect literature (see,
e.g., Gill and Robins, 2001; Lechner and Miquel, 2002; Lok, 2007; Robins, 1989, 1997; Van der
Laan and Robins, 2003). Section 3.2.2 provides some insight by highlighting the connection to
the conditional-independence assumption often employed in the structural dynamic discrete-choice
literature (see Rust, 1987; and the survey in Rust, 1994). Reduced-form approaches are not clear
about the source of the unobservables and their relationship with conditioning variables. It would
be a valuable exercise to exhibit which structural models are approximated by various reduced-form
models. In the structural analysis, this speciﬁcation emerges as part of the analysis, as our discussion
of the stochastic properties of the unobservables presented in the preceding section makes clear.
The HN analysis of both structural and reduced-form models relies heavily on limit set argu-
ments. They solve the selection problem in limit sets. The dynamic matching models of Gill and
Robins (2001) and Lok (2007) solve the selection problem by invoking recursive conditional inde-
pendence assumptions. In the context of the models of HN, they assume that the econometrician
knows the θ or can eliminate the eﬀect of θ on estimates of the model by conditioning on a suitable
set of variables. The HN analysis entertains the possibility that analysts know less than the agents
they study. It allows for some of the variables that would make matching valid to be unobservable.
As we have noted in early subsections, versions of recursive conditional independence assumptions
are also used in the dynamic discrete-choice literature (see the survey in Rust, 1994). The HN factor
models allow analysts to construct the joint distribution of outcomes across stopping times. This
feature is missing from the statistical treatment eﬀect literature.
Both HN’s structural and reduced-form models of treatment choice are stopping time models.
53Neither model allows for multiple entry into and exit from treatment, even though agents in these
models would like to reverse their treatment decisions for some realizations of their index if this was
not too costly (or, in the case of the reduced-form model, if the index thresholds for returning would
not be too low).81 Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2007) derive conditions on structural stopping
models from a more basic model that entertains the possibility of return from dropout states but
which nonetheless exhibits the stopping time property. The HN identiﬁcation strategy relies on the
nonrecurrent nature of treatment. Their identiﬁcation strategy of using limit sets can be applied to
a recurrent model provided that analysts conﬁne attention to subsets of (X,Z) such that in those
subsets the probability of recurrence is zero.
5.5 A Short Survey of Dynamic Discrete-Choice Models
Rust (1994) presents a widely cited nonparametric nonidentiﬁcation theorem for dynamic discrete-
choice models. It is important to note the restrictive nature of his negative results. He analyzes a
recurrent state inﬁnite horizon model in a stationary environment. He does not use any exclusion
restrictions or cross outcome-choice restrictions. He uses a general utility function. He places no
restrictions on period-speciﬁc utility functions such as concavity or linearity nor does he specify
restrictions connecting preferences and outcomes. One can break Rust’s nonidentiﬁcation result
with additional information.
Magnac and Thesmar (2002) present an extended comment on Rust’s analysis including positive
results for identiﬁcation when the econometrician knows the distributions of unobservables, assumes
that unobservables enter period-speciﬁc utility functions in an additively separable way and is willing
to specify functional forms of utility functions or other ingredients of the model, as do Pakes (1986),
Keane and Wolpin (1997), Eckstein and Wolpin (1999), and Hotz and Miller (1988, 1993). Magnac
and Thesmar (2002) also consider the case where one state (choice) is absorbing (as do Hotz and
Miller, 1993) and where the value functions are known at the terminal age ( ¯ T) (as do Keane and
Wolpin, 1997 and Belzil and Hansen, 2002). In HN, each treatment time is an absorbing state. In
a separate analysis, Magnac and Thesmar consider the case where unobservables from the point of
view of the econometrician are correlated over time (or age t) and choices (s) under the assumption
that the distribution of the unobservables is known. They also consider the case where exclusion
restrictions are available. Throughout their analysis, they maintain that the distribution of the
unobservables is known both by the agent and the econometrician.
HN provide semiparametric identiﬁcation of a ﬁnite-horizon ﬁnite-state model with an absorb-
ing state with semiparametric speciﬁcations of reward and cost functions.82 Given that rewards
are in value units, the scale of their utility function is ﬁxed as they also are in models of proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrms. Choices are not invariant to arbitrary aﬃne transformations so that one source
81Recall that treatment occurs if the index turns positive. If there are costs to reversing this decision, agents would
only reverse their decision if the index falls below some negative threshold. The stopping time assumption is equivalent
to the assumption that the costs of reversal are prohibitively large, or that the corresponding threshold is at the lower
end of the support of the index.
82Although their main theorems are for additively separable reward and cost functions, it appears that additive
separability can be relaxed using the analysis of Matzkin (2003).
54of nonidentiﬁability in Rust’s analysis is eliminated. They can identify the error distributions non-
parametrically given their factor structure. They do not have to assume either the functional form
of the unobservables or knowledge of the entire distribution of unobservables.
HN present a fully speciﬁed structural model of choices and outcomes motivated by, but not
identical to, the analyses of Keane and Wolpin (1994, 1997) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1999). In
their setups, outcome and cost functions are parametrically speciﬁed. Their states are recurrent
while those of HN are absorbing. In the HN model, once an agent drops out of school, the agent
does not return. In the Keane-Wolpin model, an agent who drops out can return. Keane and Wolpin
do not establish identiﬁcation of their model, whereas HN establish semiparametric identiﬁcation
of their model. They analyze models with more general times series processes for unobservables.
In both the HN and Keane-Wolpin frameworks, agents learn about unobservables. In the Keane-
Wolpin framework, such learning is about temporally independent shocks that do not aﬀect agent
expectations about returns relevant to possible future choices. The information just aﬀects the
opportunity costs of current choices. In the HN framework, learning aﬀects agent expectations
about future returns as well as current opportunity costs.
The HN model extends previous work by Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) and Cunha
and Heckman (2007, 2008); Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005, 2006) by considering explicit
multiperiod dynamic models with information updating. They consider one-shot decision models
with information updating and associated outcomes.
Their analysis is related to that of Taber (2000). Like Cameron and Heckman (1998), both
HN and Taber use identiﬁcation-in-the-limit arguments.83 Taber considers identiﬁcation of a two
period model with a general utility function, whereas in section 5.2, we discuss how HN consider
identiﬁcation of a speciﬁc form of the utility function (an earnings function) for a multiperiod
maximization problem. As in HN, Taber allows for the sequential arrival of information. His analysis
is based on conventional exclusion restrictions, but the analysis of HN is not. They use outcome
data in conjunction with the discrete dynamic choice data to exploit cross-equation restrictions,
whereas Taber does not.
The HN treatment of serially correlated unobservables is more general than any discussion that
appears in the current dynamic discrete choice and dynamic treatment eﬀect literature. They do not
invoke the strong sequential conditional independence assumptions used in the dynamic treatment
eﬀect literature in statistics (Gill and Robins, 2001; Lechner and Miquel, 2002; Lok, 2007; Robins,
1989, 1997), nor do they invoke the closely related conditional temporal independence of unobserved
state variables given observed state variables invoked by Rust (1987), Hotz and Miller (1988, 1993),
Manski (1993) and Magnac and Thesmar (2002) (in the ﬁrst part of their paper) or the independence
assumptions invoked by Wolpin (1984).84 HN allow for more general time series dependence in the
83Pakes and Simpson (1989) sketch a proof of identiﬁcation of a model of the option values of patents that is based
on limit sets for an option model.
84Manski (1993) and Hotz and Miller (1993) use a synthetic cohort eﬀect approach that assumes that young agents
will follow the transitions of contemporaneous older agents in making their lifecycle decisions. Manski and Hotz and
Miller exclude any temporally dependent unobservables from their models. The synthetic cohort approach has been
widely used in labor economics at least since Mincer (1974). See Ghez and Becker (1975), MaCurdy (1981) and
55unobservables than is entertained by Pakes (1986), Keane and Wolpin (1997) or Eckstein and Wolpin
(1999).85
Like Miller (1984) and Pakes (1986), HN explicitly model, identify and estimate agent learning
that aﬀects expected future returns.86 Pakes and Miller assume functional forms for the distributions
of the error process and for the serial correlation pattern about information updating and time series
dependence. The HN analysis of the unobservables is nonparametric and they estimate, rather than
impose, the stochastic structure of the information updating process.
Virtually all papers in the literature, including the HN analysis, invoke rational expectations. An
exception is the analysis of Manski (1993) who replaces rational expectations with a synthetic cohort
assumption that choices and outcomes of one group can be observed (and acted on) by a younger
group. This assumption is more plausible in stationary environments and excludes any temporal
dependence in unobservables. In recent work, Manski (2004) advocates use of elicited expectations
as an alternative to the synthetic cohort approach.
While HN use rational expectations, they estimate, rather than impose the structure of agent
information sets. Miller (1984), Pakes (1986), Keane and Wolpin (1997), and Eckstein and Wolpin
(1999) assume that they know the law governing the evolution of agent information up to unknown
parameters.87 Following the procedure presented in Cunha and Heckman (2007, 2008); Cunha,
Heckman, and Navarro (2005, 2006) and Navarro (2005), HN can test for which factors (θ) appear
in agent information sets at diﬀerent stages of the life cycle and they identify the distributions of
the unobservables nonparametrically.
The HN analysis of dynamic treatment eﬀects is comparable, in some aspects, to the recent
continuous-time event-history approach of Abbring and Van den Berg (2003b) previously analyzed.
Those authors build a continuous-time model of counterfactuals for outcomes that are durations.
They model treatment assignment times using a continuous-time duration model.
The HN analysis is in discrete time and builds on previous work by Heckman (1981a,c) on het-
erogeneity and state dependence that identiﬁes the causal eﬀect of employment (or unemployment)
on future employment (or unemployment).88 They model time to treatment and associated vectors
of outcome equations that may be discrete, continuous or mixed discrete-continuous. In a discrete-
time setting, they are able to generate a variety of distributions of counterfactuals and economically
motivated parameters. They allow for heterogeneity in responses to treatment that has a general
time series structure.
As noted in section 5.4, Abbring and Van den Berg (2003b) do not identify explicit agent
Mincer (1974) for applications of the synthetic cohort approach. For empirical evidence against the assumption that
the earnings of older workers are a reliable guide to the earnings of younger workers in models of earnings and schooling
choices for recent cohorts of workers, see Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006).
85Rust (1994) provides a clear statement of the stochastic assumptions underlying the dynamic discrete-choice
literature up to the date of his survey.
86As previously noted, the previous literature assumes learning only about current costs.
87They specify a priori particular processes of information arrival as well as which components of the unobservables
agents know and act on, and which components they do not.
88Heckman and Borjas (1980) investigate these issues in a continuous-time duration model. See also Heckman and
MaCurdy (1980).
56information sets as HN do in their paper and as is done in Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005), and
they do not model learning about future rewards. Their outcomes are restricted to be continuous-
time durations. The HN framework is formulated in discrete time, which facilitates the speciﬁcation
of richer unobserved and observed covariate processes than those entertained in the continuous-
time framework of Abbring and Van den Berg (2003b). It is straightforward to attach a vector of
treatment outcomes in the HN model that includes continuous outcomes, discrete outcomes and
durations expressed as binary strings.89 At a practical level, the approach often can produce very
ﬁne-grained descriptions of continuous-time phenomena by using models with many ﬁnite periods.
Clearly, a synthesis of the event-history approach with the HN approach would be highly desirable.
That would entail taking continuous-time limits of the discrete-time models. It is a task that awaits
completion.
Flinn and Heckman (1982) utilize information on stopping times and associated wages to derive
cross-equation restrictions to partially identify an equilibrium job search model for a stationary
economic environment where agents have an inﬁnite horizon. They establish that the model is non-
parametrically nonidentiﬁed. Their analysis shows that use of outcome data in conjunction with data
on stopping times is not suﬃcient to secure nonparametric identiﬁcation of a dynamic discrete-choice
model, even when the reward function is linear in outcomes unlike the reward functions in Rust
(1987) and Magnac and Thesmar (2002). Parametric restrictions can break their nonidentiﬁcation
result. Abbring and Campbell (2005) exploit such restrictions, together with cross-equation restric-
tions on stopping times and noisy outcome measures, to prove identiﬁcation of an inﬁnite-horizon
model of ﬁrm survival and growth with entrepreneurial learning. Alternatively, nonstationarity aris-
ing from ﬁnite horizons can break their nonidentiﬁcation result (see Wolpin, 1987). The HN analysis
exploits the ﬁnite-horizon backward-induction structure of our model in conjunction with outcome
data to secure identiﬁcation and does not rely on arbitrary period by period exclusion restrictions.
They substantially depart from the assumptions maintained in Rust’s nonidentiﬁcation theorem
(1994). They achieve identiﬁcation by using cross-equation restrictions, linearity of preferences and
additional measurements, and exploiting the structure of their ﬁnite horizon nonrecurrent model.
Nonstationarity of regressors greatly facilitates identiﬁcation by producing both exclusion and cur-
vature restrictions which can substitute for standard exclusion restrictions.
6 Conclusion
This paper has surveyed recent approaches to using panel data to evaluate policies. We have com-
pared and contrasted the statistical dynamic treatment approach based on sequential conditional
independence assumptions that generalize matching to approaches developed in econometrics. We
compared and contrasted a continuous-time event-history approach developed by Abbring and
Van den Berg (2003b) to discrete-time reduced-form and structural models developed by Heck-
man and Navarro (2007), and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005).
89Abbring (2008) considers nonparametric identiﬁcation of mixed semi-Markov event-history models that extends
his work with Van den Berg. See section 4.
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